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Shareholder-Authorized Corporate
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By CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY* & KATHY FOGEL**
Introduction
CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION granted
corporations a First Amendment right to purchase political advertise-
ments.1 Following this paradigm-shifting U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion, American policy makers have struggled with how to improve
corporate governance to cope with this new risky type of corporate
spending.2
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1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. For example, the DISCLOSE Act from the 111th Congress would have expanded
the definition of ads that the FEC could regulate. Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting
Light on Spending in Elections Act (“DISCLOSE Act”), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong.
§§ 103–104 (2010). This bill failed to overcome a filibuster in the Senate in 2010. Dan
Eggen, Senate Democrats Again Fail to Pass Campaign Disclosure Law, WASH. POST (Sept. 23,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/23/AR20
10092304578.html. Meanwhile, the Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong.
§ 14(c) (2010), would have given shareholders in publicly traded corporations a vote on
future political spending, and the Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 6116, 111th Cong. tit. I
(2010), would have provided public financing to Congressional candidates. These latter
bills went through committee hearings but did not receive full votes from the House. Bill
Summary & Status—111th Congress (2009–2010)—H.R.6116, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR06116:@@@X (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (showing the
Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 6116, was reported out of the Committee on House Adminis-
tration in House Report 111-691, but no floor vote was taken); Bill Summary & Status—
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As detailed in a policy report, Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving
Shareholders a Voice, released by the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
School of Law in 2010, Americans could adopt the approach embod-
ied in the U.K. Companies Act.3 Under this law, British companies
must seek permission from shareholders to make political expendi-
tures4 and must report such spending to U.K. shareholders on an an-
nual basis;5 meanwhile, political parties must report the sources of
their incoming donations to the elections authorities.6 The British ap-
proach to corporate political spending has been in place for a decade
following the Companies Act amendments in 2000 (“2000
Amendments”).7
This Article provides a first effort to gather comprehensive data
on the proposals U.K. corporate management proffer to shareholders
at annual general meetings of publicly traded firms requesting author-
ization of future political expenditures, as well as the actual corporate
political spending in the United Kingdom from the early 1990s to
111th Congress (2009–2010)—H.R.4790, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd-
query/z?d111:HR04790:@@@X (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (showing the Shareholder Pro-
tection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, was reported out of the Committee on Financial Services in
House Report 111-620, but no floor vote was taken). The Shareholder Protection Act has
been reintroduced in the 112th Congress. See H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011) (“To amend
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require shareholder authorization before a public
company may make certain political expenditures, and for other purposes.”); S. 1360,
112th Cong. (2011) (“To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require share-
holder authorization before a public company may make certain political expenditures,
and for other purposes.”).
3. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPEND-
ING, GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE (2010) (arguing for shareholder disclosure and con-
sent); see also Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 192–210
(2010) [hereinafter Corporate Governance After Citizens United] (statement of Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, Counsel, Brennan Ctr. for Justice).
4. Companies Act, 2006, c. 7, § 366 (U.K.) (requiring shareholder authorization to
make political donations).
5. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 140 (U.K.) (requir-
ing disclosure of political donations in the annual director’s report); see Companies Act
1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report etc.) Regulations, 2005, S.I.
2005/1011, art. 2 (substituting § 234ZZA (3)–(4) of the Companies Act of 1985 to require
disclosure of political contributions in the directors report to shareholders).
6. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act §§ 62–65 (requiring political par-
ties to prepare a quarterly donation report and submit it to the Electoral Commission at
the end of each reporting period).
7. See Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act §§ 139–140, sched. 19
(amending the Companies Act of 1985 and introducing annual reporting requirements of
political spending).
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2010, a time period spanning several elections.8 Armed with this data,
we studied the effects of the 2000 Amendments that require share-
holder pre-authorization of political expenditures in the United King-
dom. We hope to shed some light on whether policymakers in
America should adopt similar measures to protect shareholder
interests.
Part I details the political changes caused by Citizens United and
the legal and corporate governance challenges that U.S. policy makers
face. U.K. laws have addressed similar challenges. Part II introduces
the political background of the United Kingdom and outlines the
changes in the British Companies Act that require shareholder con-
sent on political spending. Part III introduces the data on corporate
political spending in the United Kingdom from 2000 to 2010 in an
attempt to answer at least one set of questions: How does the decade-
old system in the United Kingdom work, and what lessons does it hold
for the United States? One lesson is clear: requiring transparency and
consent for corporate political spending does not act as a corporate
ban in the United Kingdom. This is significant from a U.S. perspective
because in Citizens United the Supreme Court stated clearly that a ban
on corporate political expenditures violates the U.S. Constitution.
The data from the United Kingdom shows companies still participate
in politics after checking with their shareholders first. This indicates
that if a similar system that strengthens shareholder rights and in-
creases transparency were adopted in the United States, it would likely
survive judicial scrutiny.
I. The New American Paradigm for Corporate Political
Spending
As a result of the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United, for
the first time in decades, corporations may spend an unlimited
amount of corporate treasury funds on paid advertisements during
U.S. federal elections.9 By overruling the corporate ban on political
8. For another source examining the most recent U.K. elections, see ELECTORAL
COMM’N, UK GENERAL ELECTION 2010: CAMPAIGN SPENDING REPORT 14 (2011), http://www.
electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/109388/2010-UKPGE-Cam-
paign-expenditure-report.pdf [hereinafter UK GENERAL ELECTION 2010] (reporting non-
party campaigner spending in the 2010 U.K. general election).
9. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Here, the term “corporate
treasury” is an artifact of previous campaign finance case law and has no sensible analog in
corporate law. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990)
(“[The Michigan Campaign Finance Act] prohibits corporations from using corporate
treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candi-
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expenditures, the court turned its back on long standing precedents
that had previously upheld the ban.10 Consequently, this decision
caused a massive disruption in the rules governing American federal
elections and in the elections of twenty-two states that had previously
banned such electoral spending by companies.11 This corporate
date in elections for state office.”). The term “corporate treasury” means money that comes
directly from a corporation and is distinct from corporate PAC or SSF money, which comes
from a restricted class of individuals who are closely related to corporations, including
corporate managers, shareholders, and their families. See SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, FEC
(May 2008), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.shtml [hereinafter
FEC, SSFs and Nonconnected PACs]; Press Release, FEC, FEC Confirms that Corporation May
Solicit Contributions from Certain Individual Members of its Wholly Owned Subsidiaries
(Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090212AO_2008-
21.shtml (“[C]orporations are permitted to use general treasury funds to establish and
administer separate segregated funds, which may accept voluntary contributions from indi-
viduals and make contributions to political committees. Only individuals in the corpora-
tions’ ‘solicitable class’ may be solicited for contributions. The solicitable classes of
corporations include stockholders, executive and administrative personnel, and their fami-
lies. Corporations may also solicit individuals within the solicitable classes of their subsidi-
aries or other affiliates.”). Examples of “corporate treasury” funds are those in the
corporation’s bank account. By contrast, “money contributed to a separate segregated
fund [SSF] is held in a separate bank account from the general corporate or union trea-
sury.” FEC, CORPORATIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, at ii (2007), http://www.fec.gov/
pdf/colagui.pdf. Federal corporate PACs are restricted in how much they gather from indi-
vidual donors, and donors are on notice that the money in the corporate PAC will be used
in politics. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887–88 (“Corporations and unions are barred from
using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or electioneering communications.
They may establish, however, a ‘separate segregated fund’ (known as a political action
committee, or PAC) for these purposes. The moneys received by the segregated fund are
limited to donations from stockholders and employees of the corporation or, in the case of
unions, members of the union.” (citation omitted)). In other words, after Citizens United
corporations may still choose to use a corporate PAC or SSF, but they are no longer legally
required to do so when purchasing an ad in a federal election.
10. As Justice William Brennan wrote, laws requiring corporations to pay for political
expenditures through corporate PACs “[protect] dissenting shareholders of business cor-
porations.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J. concurring); see FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (“The resources in the treasury of a business
corporation, however, are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s polit-
ical ideas.”); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415 n.28
(1972) (“We are of the opinion that Congress intended to insure against officers proceed-
ing in such matters without obtaining the consent of shareholders by forbidding all such
[political] expenditures.” (quoting United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710, 713 (9th
Cir. 1966))); United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948) (explaining
that Taft-Hartley’s prohibition of corporate independent expenditures was motivated by
“the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribu-
tion to political parties without the consent of the stockholders”).
11. Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last visited Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter NCSL, Life After Citizens
United] (listing states that previously banned corporate, union, or both forms of election-
eering communications before Citizens United). These funding restrictions of political ads
were declared unconstitutional in Citizens United. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. Montana
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spending could potentially cost shareholders millions of dollars with-
out any indication of return on capital.
Worse yet, Citizens United opened new doors for corporations to
attempt to direct political outcomes with treasury funds and for man-
agement to engage in a pay-to-play exchange with future leaders,12
creating opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption.13 As Harvard
Professor Lucian Bebchuk argued shortly after Citizens United, “corpo-
rate meddling in politics is bad not just for those members of society
who are not corporate shareholders. It also can be expected to reduce
shareholder value and retard the development of an economy’s cor-
porate sector. That is bad for capitalists—and thus for capitalism.”14
A host of corporate governance issues arose after Citizens United as
the potential for unfettered corporate political spending by managers
in publicly traded companies unfurled. At their heart, dispersed
shareholders (principals) are likely to have difficulty monitoring and
influencing corporate managers (their agents). Furthermore, this
agency problem has two distinct components: (1) a lack of trans-
parency about the political money being spent and (2) a lack of con-
sent by shareholders to its use in politics.
An asymmetry of information among the shareholder/principals
and manager/agents allows managers to spend corporate resources in
politics in ways that are unrelated to the firm’s core business or share-
holder interests.15 Enhanced disclosure requirements are needed to
chose to defend its corporate expenditures ban under the Montana Corrupt Practices Act
of 1912 in state court. See 1913 Mont. Laws 593 (banning corporate expenditures in politi-
cal campaigns); W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., No. DA 11-0081, 2011 WL 6888567
(Mont. Dec. 30, 2011) (upholding Montana’s corporate expenditure ban after applying
strict scrutiny). Shareholders helped Montana defend the law before the Montana Su-
preme Court. See Brief of Domini Soc. Invs. LLC et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of De-
fendants/Appellants, W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., No. DA 11-0081, 2011 WL
3463446 (Mont. May 2, 2011) (supporting Montana’s attempt to defend their overturned
ban on corporate campaign contributions before the Montana Supreme Court).
12. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Opening State-
ment at the SEC Open Meeting (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2010/spch063010mls.htm (“[P]ay to play can . . . reward political connections
rather than management skill, and—as a number of recent enforcement cases have
shown—pave the way to outright fraud and corruption . . . . Pay to play practices are
corrupt and corrupting [and] breed criminal behavior.”).
13. Marvin Ammori, Corruption Economy, BOS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 26–27.
14. Lucian Bebchuk, Corporate Political Speech Is Bad for Shareholders, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bebchuk10/English.
15. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert L. Jackson, Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?,
124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89–90 (2010) (“Where the interests of directors and executives di-
verge from those of shareholders with sufficient regularity and magnitude, [such as in
executive compensation,] corporate law rules impose special requirements designed to ad-
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better inform both shareholders who underwrite this spending as well
as the voting public who must elect the next generation of leaders
amidst a new din of political advertising.
To be useful for shareholders, managers should disclose corpo-
rate political spending in a timely and non-convoluted fashion. A vari-
ety of disclosure loopholes in U.S. law have allowed corporations to
hide from public view by spending through nonprofit in-
termediaries.16 In short, the way the tax code, corporate and securities
laws, and campaign finance laws interact enables managers of publicly
traded U.S. corporations to legally mask their political spending,
thereby thwarting accountability from customers, shareholders, and
voters.
Money can get from a publicly traded corporation into the politi-
cal system without detection in the following way. First, the publicly
traded company gives a donation to a politically active nonprofit (usu-
ally organized under the Internal Revenue Code sections 501(c)(4) or
501(c)(6))17 without reporting this donation to the Securities Ex-
dress this conflict.”); Committee on Corporate Political Spending, Corporate Political Spend-
ing: Policies and Practices, Accountability and Disclosure, CONFERENCE BOARD, 7 (2011), https://
www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=corporate-political-spending-Com-
mittee-Report—-Advance-Copy.pdf&type=subsite (“[A] corporation’s direct or indirect po-
litical spending can put its reputation at risk and could adversely affect its business if the
company takes a controversial position or supports a candidate who holds positions that
are inconsistent with its corporate values or the views of a significant number of its workers,
shareholders or customers.”); Subcommittee on Money in Politics, After Citizens United:
Improving Accountability in Political Finance, COMMITTEE FOR ECON. DEV., 5 (2011), http://
www.ced.org/images/content/events/moneyinpolitics/2011/38751_citizensunited.pdf
(“Political activity also exposes companies to substantial reputational and legal risks that
endanger enterprise and shareholder value. These risks are particularly pronounced in the
case of contributions made to third party groups where the donor does not exercise con-
trol over the ways that funds will be spent.”).
16. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why
Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16
NEXUS CHAP. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (2011) (discussing disclosure loopholes in Federal and
state laws); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Transparent Elections After Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE, 6 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Disclo-
sure%20in%20the%20States.pdf (explaining how for-profit corporations can hide their
American political spending by spending through non-profits like 501(c)(4)s and
501(c)(6)s); see Kim Geiger et al., Corporate Political Transparency Ratings, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2011), http://spreadsheets.latimes.com/corporate-transparency-ratings/ (finding few
of the top seventy-five companies had full transparency around their political spending);
Donald H. Schepers & Naomi A. Gardberg, Baruch Index of Corporate Political Disclosure 2010
Results, BARUCH C. http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/baruchindex/BIResults.pdf (showing
that, on average, companies that spend the most on political activities are in reality the
ones disclosing the least information about their political activity to outsiders, such as
shareholders).
17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), (6) (2006).
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change Commission (“S.E.C.”), which currently requires no reporting
of political spending by publicly traded companies.18 Second, the po-
litically active nonprofit purchases a political ad supporting a federal
candidate. This nonprofit will report its corporate donations to the
Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) but not to the public.19 And third,
the nonprofit reports to the Federal Election Commission (“F.E.C.”)
that it has purchased an ad, but the F.E.C. only requires the nonprofit
to report earmarked donations that a donor specifically asked to be
used to buy specific ads.20 If the corporation did not “earmark” the
donation, which almost no sophisticated donor would, then its politi-
cal contribution will never be revealed to the public by the F.E.C.
From the point of view of the voting and investing public, they can see
that the nonprofit bought a political ad, but they cannot see the role
of the publicly traded company in underwriting the purchase. This
transparency problem makes it impossible for investors to monitor
how companies are using their treasury funds in the political arena.
But just as troubling as the transparency problem is, the inability
of shareholders to voice their assent to political spending manifests an
equally troubling issue. Presently, there is no corporate mechanism in
the United States for shareholders to consent or object to a company’s
political spending. Even though the Supreme Court majority in Citi-
zens United conceptualized corporations as collections of individuals
with joint First Amendment rights,21 it is unclear how shareholders
18. Letter from Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Comm. on Disclosure of Corporate Political
Spending, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Bebchuk Let-
ter], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf (“Because the
Commission’s current rules do not require public companies to give shareholders detailed
information on corporate spending on politics, shareholders cannot play the role the [Su-
preme] Court described.”).
19. L. PAIGE WHITAKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41096, LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 6 n.41 (2010), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41096.pdf (“Under the Internal Revenue Code,
§ 501(c) organizations that file an annual information return (Form 990) are generally
required to disclose significant donors (typically those who give at least $5000 during the
year) to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). No identifying information of donors to
§ 501(c) organizations is subject to public disclosure under the tax laws except in the case
of private foundations (which are a type of § 501(c)(3) organization).” (citation omitted)).
20. Instructions for Preparing FEC FORM 9 (24 Hour Notice of Disbursements for Election-
eering Communications), FEC, 4, http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm9i.pdf (last visited
Oct. 9, 2011) (“All filers: Provide the sum total of donations itemized . . . . If you are a
corporation, labor organization or Qualified Nonprofit Corporation . . . and you received
no donations made specifically for the purpose of funding electioneering communica-
tions, enter ‘0’ (zero).”).
21. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 n.7 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“The authorized spokesman of a corporation is a human being, who speaks on behalf of
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can voice their opinions collectively without a consent process.22 With-
out an opportunity for shareholders to express their heterogeneous
interests and opinions,23 managers could misrepresent all or some
subset of shareholders’ voices and political inclinations.24
Furthermore, investors have reasons to worry about future politi-
cal spending because initial evidence from one published and two
working papers indicates that corporate political spending has hurt
shareholder value.25 Meanwhile, courts historically have denied relief
the human beings who have formed that association—just as the spokesman of an unincor-
porated association speaks on behalf of its members.”).
22. See Ronald Gilson & Michael Klausner, Op-Ed., Corporations Can Now Fund Politi-
cians. What Should Investors Do?, FORBES, Mar. 29, 2010, at 28 (“The answer is to mandate
that corporations let stockholders vote annually on whether they want the company to
exercise the rights that Citizens United gave them to get into political races.”); see also Steven
Rosenfeld, The Uphill Battle Against Citizens United: Tricky Legal Terrain and No Easy Fixes,
ALTERNET (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/environment/153814/
the_uphill_battle_against_citizens_united%3A_tricky_legal_terrain_and_no_easy_fixes/
?page=entire (“Beyond passing more disclosure laws that report political spending, states
could require shareholders to approve corporate political expenditures. ‘These kinds of
laws have been adopted for unions. It’s time to do it with regard to corporations,’ [Erwin
Chemerinsky] said.”).
23. Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corpo-
rate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 57–58
(2001); see Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2006) (“Political contributions are gener-
ally not disclosed to the board or shareholders, nor are political expenditures generally
subject to oversight as part of a corporation’s internal controls. The lack of oversight
makes it difficult for corporate decision makers and stakeholders to evaluate the costs and
benefits of political activity.”).
24. Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae Sen. John McCain et al. in Support of Appel-
lee at 2, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365214 at *2
(“The tremendous resources business corporations and unions can bring to bear on elec-
tions, and the greater magnitude of the resulting apparent corruption, amply justify treat-
ing corporate and union expenditures differently from those by individuals and
ideological nonprofit groups. So, too, does the countervailing free-speech interest of the
many shareholders who may not wish to support corporate electioneering but have no
effective means of controlling what corporations do with what is ultimately the sharehold-
ers’ money.”).
25. Michael Hadani, Institutional Ownership Monitoring and Corporate Political Activity:
Governance Implications, J. BUS. RES. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MiamiImageURL&_cid=271680&_user=50858
80&_pii=S0148296311001378&_check=y&_origin=search&_coverDate=31-May-2011&view=
c&wchp=dGLzVlt-zSkzS&md5=013a7212e805d8bf2431318ec04a22b4/1-s2.0-S01482963110
01378-main.pdf (“[R]esearch indicates that [corporate political activity] is uncertain and
increases information asymmetries between owners and managers.”); John C. Coates IV,
Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on
Shareholder Wealth? 1 (Harv. L. & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 684, 2010), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680861 (“The paper finds that in the pe-
riod 1998–2004 shareholder-friendly governance was consistently and strongly negatively
related to observable political activity before and after controlling for established corre-
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to shareholders who have sued companies to protest corporate politi-
cal spending after the fact.26 This lack of post-hoc legal redress makes
prophylactic rules to protect shareholders all the more necessary.
Recognizing these post-Citizens United agency problems, a signifi-
cant portion of the popular press in the United States has written in
favor of adopting shareholder consent mechanisms.27 The general
public has also expressed dismay with Citizens United and support for
lates of that activity, even in a firm fixed effects model.”); Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corpo-
rate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?, at Abstract (Nov. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670
(“Firms that donate have operating characteristics consistent with the existence of a free
cash flow problem, and donations are negatively correlated with returns. A $10,000 in-
crease in donations is associated with a reduction in annual excess returns of 13.9 basis
points.”); see Letter of Michael Hadani, Assistant Professor of Mgmt., Long Island Univ., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, S.E.C. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/
4637-8.pdf (After analyzing an eleven-year sample of 1110 small-, mid-, and large-cap Stan-
dard & Poor firms, economist Michael Hadani, Ph.D., reported to the SEC: “[T]he regres-
sion analysis reveals that [corporate] PAC expenditures and cumulative PAC expenditures
have a statistically significant negative affect [sic] on firms’ market value, both when exam-
ining their year to year PAC expenditures and also when examining their cumulative, 11
years, PAC expenditures.”).
26. See, e.g., Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (upholding
political expenditure under business judgment rule because corporation properly sought
“election of candidates open to [its] position on various issues”); Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 324 (1975) (“[T]he judgment of the board of directors cannot be
disturbed . . . unless . . . the [political] contribution could not be construed as incidental or
expedient for the attainment of corporate purposes.”); see also Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that charitable contribution fall-
ing within the threshold of tax deductibility will tend to be valid business judgment); Kahn
v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61, 63 (Del. 1991) (“[N]ot every charitable gift constitutes a valid
corporate action[,] . . . [but] given . . . the tax benefits[,] . . . the gift . . . was within the
range of reasonableness . . . .”).
27. E.g., Editorial, A Supreme Court Stretch, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A28 (“Congress
also could consider regulations that would require unions and public companies to ensure
that their political activities are supported by the rank-and-file or shareholders.”); Edito-
rial, A Vote for Disclosure, WASH. POST, July 27, 2010, at A16 (“Corporations now can funnel
money to a trade association to target Representative Y or Senator X. The trade association
must report its spending to the Federal Election Commission, but it doesn’t have to say
where the money comes from.”); Editorial, Corporate Blunder, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 25,
2010, at A10 (“Congress must immediately blunt the impact of the Supreme Court’s disas-
trous decision allowing unlimited corporate spending on elections. . . . They could require
stronger rules against campaigns’ coordinating with outside groups, or require publicly-
traded firms to get approval from shareholders before spending on elections.”); Editorial,
Corporations Aren’t People, Don’t Merit Special Protections, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2010, at 10
(“Congress should require corporations to seek shareholders’ permission before spending
money in political campaigns, coupled with a similar restriction on unions.”); Editorial,
The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A30 (“Congress . . . should also
enact a law requiring publicly-traded corporations to get the approval of their shareholders
before spending on political campaigns.”).
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corporate governance solutions.28 Meanwhile, polling of business
leaders indicates they would welcome increased transparency,29 and
certain corporate governance leaders have also embraced the need
for a shareholder vote.30
It should be noted that Citizens United did not deregulate all the
rules that apply to corporate political spending in the United States.
While the decision allowed corporations (and unions) to buy political
28. E.g., Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship is Campaign Issue on Which Both Parties Can
Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, at A15 (finding that 72% of respondents to a Washington
Post poll supported an effort by Congress to reinstate limits on corporate and union spend-
ing on election campaigns); Memorandum from Stan Greenberg et al., Greenberg Quin-
lan Rosner Research, to the Common Cause, Change Congress, Public Campaign Action
Fund 2 (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/articles/2425/
5613_Campaign%20Finance%20Memo_Final.pdf (finding “[b]y a stark 64 to 27 percent
margin, voters oppose this decision, with 47 percent strongly opposed” and “[a] majority of
voters strongly favor both requiring corporations to get shareholder approval for political
spending (56 percent strongly favor, 80 percent total favor)”); New Poll Shows Broad Support
for “Fixing” Citizens United, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.pfaw.org/
press-releases/2010/02/new-poll-shows-broad-support-for-fixing-citizens-united (“75% [of
respondents to a survey] believe that a publicly traded company should get shareholder
approval before spending money in an election.”); see also Chad S. Novak & Andrew E.
Smith, Granite State Poll for Americans for Campaign Reform and Committee for Economic Develop-
ment 1 (Oct. 2011) http://www.ced.org/images/content/events/moneyinpolitics/2011/
acr_october_survey_final.pdf (finding “[a]lmost Two-thirds (61%) of likely New Hamp-
shire Republican Primary voters strongly disagree with the Supreme Court decision that
political spending by corporations and unions is a form of free speech protected under the
First Amendment” and “[j]ust under three-quarters of likely GOP New Hampshire Primary
voters (73%) strongly support a law that would require corporations, unions, and non-
profits to disclose their sources of spending when they participate in elections”).
29. Press Release, Comm. for Econ. Dev., New Business Poll Shows Discontent with
Undisclosed Campaign Expenditures Following Citizens United Decision (Oct. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.ced.org/news-events/campaign-finance-reform/561-press release
(indicating that 77% of business leaders believe corporations should disclose all of their
political spending, including that funneled through third parties, and 66% agreed that the
lack of transparency and oversight in corporate political spending puts corporations at
legal and reputational risk).
30. John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its Say. Now Let Shareholders Decide, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK9 (suggesting that “[i]nstitutional investors should insist that
the proxy statement of each company in which they invest contain the following: ‘Resolved:
That the corporation shall make no political contributions without the approval of the
holders of at least 75 percent of its shares outstanding,’” and calling on institutional inves-
tors to “stand up to the Supreme Court’s misguided decision and bring democracy to cor-
porate governance . . . and take that first step along the road to reducing the dominant
role that big money plays in our political system.”); Nell Minow, Shareholders United: SEC
Rules That Political-Spending Proposal Must Go to a Vote, BNET (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.
bnet.com/blog/corporate-governance/shareholders-united-sec-rules-that-political-spend-
ing-proposal-must-go-to-a-vote/366 (“Companies that want to avoid more new rules should
begin to reach out to their shareholders to explain their procedures and criteria for politi-
cal campaign and lobbying contributions and be able to show how they support both the
brand and long-term shareholder returns.”).
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ads, it left intact other long-standing campaign finance restrictions.
The most notable of these surviving restrictions is the 1907 Tillman
Act,31 which bans corporations from giving corporate treasury funds
directly to candidates for federal office.32 Rather, U.S. corporations
may either make independent expenditures in support of federal can-
didates directly from their corporate treasuries, or they can utilize sep-
arate segregated funds (“SSFs”)—also known as corporate political
action committees (“PACs”).33 Corporate SSFs are not funded by the
corporate treasury. Rather, these SSFs are funded voluntarily by em-
ployees and shareholders in amounts of $5000 or less.34 Such SSFs
may give directly to federal candidate committees.35
Presently, the U.K. approach has been one of the models actively
debated by both legislative and executive branches in the United
States to address the new legal terrain that Citizens United created.36
The U.K. Companies Act provides a living example of how corporate
law could be changed to address the ability of companies to engage in
politics and make corporate political spending transparent and
accountable.
II. The British System
Below we examine the differences and similarities between the
United Kingdom and United States, both in terms of their electoral
systems, which diverge markedly, and their financial systems, which
31. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (2006)). The amended statute prohibits corporations (for profit or non-
profit), labor organizations, and incorporated membership organizations from making di-
rect contributions in connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b. This restriction
was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003)
(“[T]he [corporate contribution] ban has always done further duty in protecting ‘the indi-
viduals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the
support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to
whom they may be opposed.’” (citation omitted)).
32. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)–(b)(2). But see United States v. Danielczyk, 791 F. Supp. 2d
513, 518 (E.D. Va. 2011), appeal filed, No. 11-4667 (4th Cir. June 29, 2011) (holding the
federal Tillman Act’s ban on corporate donations unconstitutional as applied to a specific
corporation). In addition, corporations cannot give direct contributions to candidates in
many states. See NCSL, Life After Citizens United, supra note 11 (listing states that ban cor-
porate contributions).
33. FEC, SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, supra note 9.
34. Id.
35. 11 C.F.R. § 100.6 (2011); FEC, SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, supra note 9.
36. See Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011) (modeled on the
U.K. system); Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 291322 (Feb. 16, 2011)
(allowing shareholders a proxy vote on an advisory vote on future political spending by
Home Depot).
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are quite analogous. This section also explains the motivations for the
2000 Amendments to the U.K. Companies Act of 1985, which in-
cluded (1) political scandals in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and
1990s; (2) the investigation of a Parliamentary Committee on Stan-
dards in Public Life; (3) the public’s desire for greater transparency of
party financing; and (4) corporate governance experts’ concern that
there was little accountability for corporate political spending in the
United Kingdom pre-2000.
A. The United Kingdom’s Parliamentary System and Capital
Markets
The United Kingdom and the United States had similar legal and
historical roots, but their political systems diverged. Unlike the United
States, which has constitutional separation of powers, such that U.S.
citizens elect members of Congress (the legislature) separately from
the President (the executive),37 the United Kingdom is a parliamen-
tary democracy.38 U.K. citizens vote to elect the Parliament at the gen-
eral elections, occurring once every five years, or earlier if either the
government passes a motion of no confidence and the House of Lords
fails to pass a motion of confidence, or the House of Commons passes
a general election motion by two thirds of the total number of seats.39
The party that wins the most seats in the Parliament forms the govern-
ment, i.e., the executive, until the next general election.40 The gov-
ernment carries out the stated policy of its party, through such
departments as the Ministry of Defense and the Department of
Health.41 The Parliament, in contrast, evaluates the work of the gov-
ernment, debates and passes laws, and permits the government to
raise taxes.42
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
38. Parliament and Government, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/
how/role/parliament-government/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
39. General Elections, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elec-
tions-and-voting/general/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) [hereinafter General Elections]. In prac-
tice, each general election almost always occurs within four to five years of the previous
one. See General Election Results from 1945–2010, UK POL. INFO, http://www.ukpolitical.info/
ByYear.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
40. General Elections, supra note 39.
41. See Parliament and Government, supra note 38 (“The Prime Minister appoints minis-
ters, including the Cabinet, who often work in a government department, and run and
develop public services and policies.”).
42. Parliament’s Role, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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The United Kingdom has devolved certain legislative powers to
its member countries, including Scotland, which has its own parlia-
ment, and Northern Ireland and Wales, which have national assem-
blies.43 The powers of these legislative bodies are not coextensive with
those of the U.K. Parliament. For example, the Scottish Parliament
may pass laws regarding health and education but not foreign policy
or national defense.44
The United Kingdom also has a different set of campaign finance
rules than the United States. In the United States, the Supreme
Court’s Buckley v. Valeo decision in 1976 declared expenditure limits
for political campaigns unconstitutional.45 The United Kingdom takes
the opposite approach and has expenditure limits for both candidates
and non-candidates. Since 1884, the Representation of the People Act
(“RPA”) has governed British campaign finance.46 As Lori Ringhand
explained, under the RPA:
Election spending of individual candidates within each constitu-
ency was strictly limited. These limits allowed an equal base level of
spending for all candidates, with additional spending allowed on a
per-elector basis. In the 1997 elections, the average constituency
spending limit was around £8,000. The RPA also limited direct ad-
vocacy spending by non-candidates. Direct advocacy spending is
spending that advocates the election of a specific candidate in a
specific constituency. The RPA, as interpreted in the Tronoh
Mines case, did not impose any restrictions on national-level politi-
cal advocacy in support or opposition to political parties, even
when such advocacy was undertaken during a general election.47
The £8,000 expenditure limit for parliamentary candidates was
roughly $12,880 in U.S. dollars. By comparison, in the United States
where no expenditure limit exists, the average expenditures for win-
ning candidates in 1996 were $680,000 for the U.S. House of Repre-
43. Devolved Parliaments and Assemblies, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/
about/how/role/devolved/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
44. See id. (“Devolved powers are decisions that Parliament used to control, but are
now taken by the separate bodies, ie [sic], the Scottish Parliament. This could include
matters like education or health. Reserved powers are those decisions that remain with
Parliament in Westminster.”).
45. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
46. Representation of the People Act, 1884, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
47. Lori A. Ringhand, Concepts of Equality in British Election Financing Reform Proposals,
22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 255 (2002) (footnote omitted); see R. v. Tronoh Mines,
Ltd., [1952] 1 All E.R. 697 (Q.B. Cent. Crim. Ct.) (mining company did not violate the
RPA by funding a newspaper ad before a general election encouraging the public to vote
for a different government). But see Bowman v. United Kingdom, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 176,
207–08 (holding that section 75 of RPA violated the freedom of expression rights guaran-
teed under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
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sentatives and $3,775,000 for the U.S. Senate.48 The cost of U.S.
federal elections has only gone up in the intervening fourteen years.
In 2010, the average expenditure by winning congressional candidates
was $1.4 million, and the average expenditure by winning senatorial
candidates was $9 million.49
Furthermore, the United Kingdom bans paid broadcast advertise-
ments in political campaigns.50 This ban may run afoul of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, Article 10, which protects
freedom of expression for members of the European Union (“EU”).51
Nevertheless, the House of Lords upheld this broadcast ad ban in the
face of a challenge in 2008, stating that the ban on political advertis-
ing on television and radio is “necessary in a democratic society,” and
is therefore a legitimate restriction on free speech under Article 10.52
In its 2008 case, the House of Lords explained:
The fundamental rationale of the democratic process is that if
competing views, opinions and policies are publicly debated and
exposed to public scrutiny the good will over time drive out the
bad and the true prevail over the false. It must be assumed that,
given time, the public will make a sound choice . . . . But it is highly
desirable that the playing field of debate should be so far as practi-
cable level.53
In other words, the United Kingdom accepts the argument that
leveling the playing field is a reasonable justification for restricting
political spending. This “leveling the playing field” rationale was
roundly rejected by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Federal Election Com-
mission,54 Citizens United,55 and most recently in Arizona Free Enterprise
48. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-793 GOV, CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
SPENDING: 1976–1996 at 4 (1997); The Problem: An Unprecedented Flood of Special-Interest Money
in 1996, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS, http://www.lwv.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&
template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3714 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
49. Price of Admission, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.open
secrets.org/bigpicture/stats.php?cycle=2010&type=W&display=A (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
50. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (U.K.).
51. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 (providing for “freedom of
expression”).
52. R. (Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & Sport, [2008]
UKHL 15, [2008] 1 A.C. 1312, 1349 (appeal taken from Eng.) (upholding the Communi-
cations Act 2003).
53. Id. at 1346.
54. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 726 (2008) (“[A]n interest in leveling electoral oppor-
tunities for candidates of different personal wealth [cannot] justify §319(a)’s asymmetrical
limits.” (citation omitted)).
55. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–05 (2010) (“The rule that political
speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the
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Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.56 Therefore, it is not particularly
surprising that the United States has not followed this U.K. prohibi-
tion on broadcast ads, which are a regular (and often costly) feature
of U.S. federal, state, and local elections.57
The schedule of parliamentary elections in England has an im-
pact on the data that we have analyzed here as well. Just like the
United States, political spending in the United Kingdom is cyclical
and goes up when an election is pending and typically dips in off
years. Below is a list of the election dates and results during
1993–2010, the period this Article examines.
Exhibit 1: Elections in the United Kingdom: Dates and
Percentages of the Popular Vote
United Kingdom General Elections58
Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat
May 6, 2010 8,606,518 (29.0%) 10,703,744 (36.1%) 6,836,198 (23.0%)
May 5, 2005 9,556,183 (35.2%) 8,772,599 (32.4%) 5,982,164 (22.0%)
June 7, 2001 10,724,895 (40.7%) 8,357,622 (31.7%) 4,812,833 (18.3%)
May 1, 1997 13,518,167 (43.2%) 9,600,943 (30.7%) 5,242,94 (16.8%)
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech
based on the speaker’s identity.”).
56. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826
(2011) (“‘Leveling the playing field’ can sound like a good thing. But in a democracy,
campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form of speech. The First
Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the
guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered interchange of ideas’—not whatever the
State may view as fair.” (citation omitted)).
57. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (striking a ban on corporate independent
expenditures); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–49 (striking a ban on personal indepen-
dent expenditures).
58. Political Data from 1945 to the Present, UK POL. INFO, http://www.ukpolitical.info/
Historical.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (follow “2010,” “2005,” “2001,” and “1997”
hyperlinks).
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Northern Ireland Assembly Elections59
Social
Democratic Democratic and
Unionist Sinn Fein Ulster Unionist Labour
March 7, 2007 207,721 (30.1%) 180,573 (26.2%) 103,145 (15.2%) 105,164 (14.9%)
Nov. 26, 2003 177,470 (25.6%) 162,758 (23.5%) 156,931 (22.7%) 117,547 (17%)
June 25, 1998 146,989 (18.1%) 142,858 (17.6%) 172,225 (21.3%) 177,963 (22%)
Scotland Parliamentary Elections60
Scottish National Conservative and
Party (“SNP”) Labour Unionist Liberal Democrat
May 3, 2007 1,297,838 (36.4%) 1,243,789 (35.7%) 618,778 (13.2%) 556,883 (12.4%)
May 1, 2003 855,381 (20.9%) 1,224,960 (38.8%) 615,208 (14.0%) 520,121 (13.2%)
May 6, 199961 1,311,412 (27.1%) 1,695,164 (43.4%) 723,534 (14.0%) 623,939 (13.2%)
59. Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 2007, ARK N. IR., http://www.
ark.ac.uk/elections/fa07.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011); Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland
Elections 2003, ARK N. IR., http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa03.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2011); Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Elections 1998, ARK N. IR., http://www.ark.ac.uk/
elections/fa98.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
60. Share of Constituency and Regional Votes by Party, SCOT. PARLIAMENT, http://www.
scottish.parliament.uk/Electionresults/2007%20election/Table2.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2011) (reporting results of 2007 Scottish Parliament elections); Votes and Seats, SCOT.
PARLIAMENT, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Electionresults/2004%20election/table
12.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (reporting on the number of votes received by each
political party in the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections); Share of Constituency and Regional
Votes by Party, SCOT. PARLIAMENT, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Electionresults/
2004%20election/table2.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (reporting on each party’s share of
constituency in the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections); Bryn Morgan, Scottish Parliament
Elections: 6 May 1999, at 8 tbl.2 (House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 99/50,
1999), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-045.
pdf [hereinafter Scottish Parliament Elections 1999] (reporting “Share of Constituency and
Regional votes by Party” for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections).
61. Figures were derived by adding total constituency vote data (672,768 votes for the
SNP; 908,346 votes for the Labour Party; 364,425 votes for the Conservative and Unionist
Party; and 333,179 votes for the Liberal Democrat Party) and total regional list vote data
(638,644 votes for the SNP; 786,818 votes for the Labour Party; 359,109 votes for the
Conservative and Unionist Party; and 290,760 votes for the Liberal Democrat Party). See
Scottish Parliament Elections 1999, supra note 60, at 8 tbl.2 (reporting constituency and
regional list votes by party during the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election).
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Wales Assembly Elections62
Liberal
Labour Conservative Plaid Cymru Democrat
May 3, 2007 603,879 (30.9%) 427,883 (21.9%) 423,878 (21.7%) 258,950 (13.3%)
May 1, 2003 651,173 (38.3%) 332,157 (19.5%) 347,836 (20.5%) 228,233 (13.4%)
May 6, 199963 746,328 (46.7%) 330,339 (15.0%) 602,620 (28.3%) 265,865 (10.0%)
As the election results in Exhibit 1 demonstrate, there was a de-
gree of fluidity in the U.K. elections where political power changed
among political parties, even over the relatively short period
(1993–2010) that was covered by this Article.
While comparisons between the U.S. and U.K. political systems
are admittedly difficult because the two are different in both degree
and kind, the organizational structure of publicly traded corporations
in the capital markets of both countries are remarkably similar.64 Spe-
cifically, small and diverse shareholders hold shares of major corpora-
tions in the United Kingdom and the United States, with no
controlling owners holding 20% or more voting shares.65 In contrast,
62. NIA JONES, MEMBERS’ RESEARCH SERV., NO. 07/063/NJ, 2007 ASSEMBLY ELECTION
RESULTS 8 (2007), available at http://www.assemblywales.org/07-063.pdf (summarizing the
results of the May 3, 2007, Wales Assembly elections); Ross Young, Welsh Assembly Elections: 1
May 2003, at 3 (House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 03/45, 2003), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-045.pdf
(summarizing the results of the May 1, 2003, Wales Assembly elections); Bryn Morgan,
Welsh Assembly Elections: 1 May 1999, at 3 (House of Commons Library, Research Paper No.
99/51, 1999), available at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-
051.pdf (summarizing the results of the May 1, 1999, Wales Assembly elections).
63. Figures were derived by adding total constituency vote data (384,671 votes for the
Labour Party; 162,133 votes for the Conservative Party; 290,572 votes for Plaid Cymru; and
137,857 votes for the Liberal Democrat Party) and total regional list vote data (361,657
votes for the Labour Party; 168,206 votes for the Conservative Party; 312,048 votes for Plaid
Cymru; and 128,008 votes for the Liberal Democrat Party). See Morgan, supra note 62, at 6
(summarizing the results of the May 1, 1999, Wales Assembly elections). The percentages
of the popular vote were derived by dividing the total number of seats won by each party
(twenty-eight seats by the Labour Party; nine by the Conservative Party; seventeen by Plaid
Cymru; and six by the Liberal Democrat Party) by the total number of seats up for election
(sixty). Id.
64. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond
the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 78 (2010) (“[T]he United States and the
U.K. share a common legal heritage and because their markets share important similari-
ties—both have been historically characterized by a base of dispersed investors.”). See gener-
ally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (explaining that the United States and the United
Kingdom both demonstrate good shareholder protection and widely held medium-sized
firms).
65. See Kathy Fogel, Oligarchic Family Control, Social Economic Outcomes, and the Quality of
Government, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 603, 606 (2006) (“Organizations are classified as widely
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in many other countries, extremely wealthy families control large busi-
nesses through complex pyramidal structure,66 dual class shares with
voting differentials,67 or cross holdings among group companies.68
The governance structure of large U.K. and U.S. companies are gener-
ally referred to as a system of “shareholder democracy,”69 where share-
holders enjoy one share, one vote and collectively exercise their
ownership and control rights through proxy voting and election of
board of directors.70
As no other countries share the same corporate governance struc-
ture, we drew on the U.K. experience to study how best to protect
shareholder interests through proxy voting on corporate political
spending proposals at annual meetings as dictated by the U.K. Com-
panies Act.71 We hope this natural experiment provides evidence
about whether the United States should adopt an approach similar to
the U.K. corporate governance rules post-Citizens United.
B. The British Law Governing Corporate Political Spending
Unlike their American cousins, the United Kingdom has corpo-
rate governance rules in place to ensure both transparency and ac-
held if no owner controls more than 20% of the vote and small distant shareholders elect
the board and appoint CEOs. Dispersed ownership structure is common among large cor-
porations in the United States and the United Kingdom, and among agricultural and retail
cooperatives in European and Oceanic countries.”).
66. La Porta et al., supra note 64, at 511.
67. See, e.g., Brian F. Smith & Ben Amoako-Adu, Relative Prices of Dual Class Shares, 30 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 223 (1995) (“Companies issue dual class common shares
with differential voting rights to separate control from ownership. The significant value of
control is evidenced by the higher price paid for superior voting shares (SVS) relative to
the price paid for restricted shares (RVS).”); see La Porta et al., supra note 64, at 473 (indi-
cating that in countries with poor minority shareholder protection, shareholders hold
more voting rights because losing control of the company may be costly).
68. See, e.g., Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Banks and Corporate Control in Japan,
54 J. FIN. 319, 320 (1999) (describing the use of cross-holding as a guard against hostile
takeovers in Japan).
69. Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effective-
ness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 2–5, 23–24 (2008).
70. Id.
71. See Paying for Politics: the Principles of Funding Political Parties, HANSARD SOC’Y, 5 (July
2006), http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/files/folders/90/download.aspx (“Donations
made by corporate bodies – whether public companies, trade unions, or other member-
ship bodies – should proceed from a clear definition of the interests of the organisation.
Members and/or shareholders should be given the opportunity to explicitly agree or disa-
gree to political donations or loans. These principles were recommended by the Neill
Committee and have been embodied in statutory provisions that require directors of a
company or trade union officials to seek approval of donations or expenses incurred for
political purposes.”).
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countability for corporate political spending. This section will explore
the 2000 Amendments to the U.K. Companies Act in more detail, as
well as explain why the Amendments were needed in the first place. In
short, before 2000, political party finances were opaque, and corpo-
rate controls over money going directly to British political parties were
lax.72 To address these problems, the 2000 Amendments required dis-
closure of corporate political spending both to investors and to the
Electoral Commission.73 Furthermore, the 2000 Amendments require
shareholders to pre-authorize corporate political spending in publicly
traded companies.74
1. The 2000 Amendments to the U.K. Companies Act
Post-Citizens United, the United States allows utterly opaque corpo-
rate political spending through circuitous nonprofit intermediaries.75
72. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION AND THE FUNDING OF UK POLITICAL PARTIES 6–7
(2006), available at http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/2006-publications/14-
corruption-and-the-funding-of-uk-political-parties/download (“Until 2000, the UK had one
of the world’s least regulated political financing regimes. Calls for reform and draft legisla-
tion had been on the parliamentary agenda from the time of the Houghton Committee in
the 1970s . . . . A series of critical press stories suggesting the exercise of political influence
in favour of rich individuals added to the pressure to reform the system. The result was the
PPERA, 2000.”).
73. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–140, sched.
19 (U.K.); Explanatory Notes to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000,
c. 41, ¶ 11, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/notes/division/2/9 (“Part IX
[of the PPERA] introduces a requirement that shareholder consent must be obtained
before a company makes a donation to a political party or incurs political expenditure. It
also requires the disclosure of political expenditure in directors’ annual reports to
shareholders.”).
74. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act § 139, sched. 19; Explanatory
Notes to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, ¶ 11.
75. E.g., T.W. Farnam & Dan Eggen, Outside Spending Up Sharply for Midterms, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 2010, at A1 (“Interest groups are spending five times as much on the 2010
congressional elections as they did on the last midterms, and they are more secretive than
ever about where that money is coming from.”); Mike McIntire, Under Tax-Exempt Cloak,
Political Dollars Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A1 (“[In the 2010 elections, nonprofit
groups] spent more than $100 million—mostly for Republicans and more than twice as
much as at this point four years ago.”); Albert R. Hunt, Watergate Return Inevitable as Cash
Floods Elections, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
17/more-cash-blots-out-sunlight-in-u-s-elections-albert-hunt.html (“This year, there is a
massive infusion of special-interest money into U.S. politics that is secret, not reported.
Corporations and other interests will spend more than $250 million of undisclosed funds
to affect the outcome of the Nov. 2 national elections.”); Kristin Jensen & Jonathan D.
Salant, Republican Groups Use Hidden Money to Overcome Democrats’ Cash, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/
sep2010/db20100921_184373.htm (“Republican-leaning groups that don’t disclose their
donors are raising and spending millions of dollars on the U.S. congressional elections,
helping make up for the party’s fundraising deficit.”); Chisun Lee, Higher Corporate Spend-
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By contrast, the United Kingdom allows direct corporate donations
from the corporate treasury to candidates and political parties, yet
U.K. companies spend transparently.76 In 2000, under the Political
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (“PPERA”),77 the United
Kingdom adopted amendments to its Companies Act of 1985, which
required British companies to disclose political contributions to its
shareholders.78 Under the 2000 amendments, if a publicly traded
company made a political donation of over £2000, the directors’ an-
nual report to the shareholders must include the donation’s recipient
and the donation amount.79 In England, the directors’ report is
equivalent to a company’s annual report to the S.E.C. in the United
States, and £2000 is roughly equal to $3000 at current exchange
rates.80 The Companies Act was amended again in 2006.81 The
ing on Election Ads Could Be All but Invisible, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.
propublica.org/article/higher-corporate-spending-on-election-ads-could-be-all-but-invisi-
ble (“[N]onprofit groups don’t have to disclose the sources of their advertising money,
unless the donors specified that their contributions were intended for political ads.”).
76. Certain authors in Britain have argued that the law should ban corporations from
making political expenditures. AUSTIN MITCHELL & PREM SIKKA, ASS’N ACCOUNTANCY &
BUS. AFF., TAMING THE CORPORATIONS 50 (2005), available at http://visar.csustan.edu/
aaba/TamingtheCorporations.pdf (“Companies should be banned from making any politi-
cal donations to individual politicians or parties.”).
77. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act §§ 139–140, sched. 19.
78. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 235(3), sched. 7 (U.K.); see also Explanatory Notes to
the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, ¶ 246, http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/notes/division/5/9 (The Act “requires directors of compa-
nies to seek the approval of the company in general meeting to the making of political
donations to political parties or organisations or to the incurring of expenditure for politi-
cal purposes.”).
79. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act § 140. The original reporting
threshold in the 2000 law was £200. Id. The amount was later raised to £2000 in 2007 under
secondary legislation, the British equivalent of American implementing regulations. See
Government Response to Consultation on the Companies Act 2006: Accounting and Reporting Regu-
lations, DEP’T BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS (June 19, 2007), http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/
file40480.doc.
80. See Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act § 140 (requiring disclosure of
political contributions in the directors’ report); see also Guidance to Candidates and Agents:
Local Government Elections in England, ELECTORAL COMM’N 2 (2007), http://www.dacorum.
gov.uk/pdf/electoral%20commission%20guidance.pdf (“The [Electoral] Commission is
responsible for overseeing a number of aspects of electoral law – the registration of politi-
cal parties and third parties, the monitoring and publication of significant donations to
registered political parties and the regulation of national party spending on election cam-
paigns.”). As of December 27, 2011, the exchange rate between dollars and British pounds
was 0.6381 British pounds per dollar. Exchange Rates: New York Closing Snapshot, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3021-forex.html (click on
“Find Historical Data” and select December 27, 2011).
81. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.); see also Companies Act 2006: Regulatory Impact
Assessment, DEP’T BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/
file29937.pdf (discussing changes introduced by the Companies Act of 2006). As a result of
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amended Act covers political advertisements in addition to direct do-
nations to candidates or parties.82
In addition to requiring disclosure, the U.K. Companies Act re-
quires publicly traded companies to obtain shareholder consent for
corporate political spending over £5000 (approximately $8000 at cur-
rent exchange rates) before the corporate money is spent.83 If share-
holders do not approve a given political donation resolution, that
company cannot make political contributions during the relevant pe-
riod.84 Shareholder approval for political spending originally required
an annual vote; however, in 2006 the law changed to allow for votes to
cover up to four years at a time.85 Finally, directors who make unau-
thorized political donations are personally liable to the company for
the amount spent, plus interest, and they must compensate the com-
pany for any loss or damage resulting from the unauthorized dona-
tion or expenditure.86 In our data, we found that shareholders
generally pre-authorized corporate political donations of £5000 or
the 2006 amendments, donations to trade unions are exempt. Companies Act § 374. In
addition, directors are jointly and severally liable for any unauthorized political expendi-
tures plus interest. Companies Act § 369.
82. Companies Act, §§ 364–365. See Companies Act, COMPANIES HOUSE (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/companiesAct/implementations/oct2008.shtml (“A
company must also be authorised by its members before it incurs expenditure in respect of
political activities such as advertising, promotion or otherwise supporting a political party,
political organisation [o]r an independent candidate in an election.”).
83. Companies can spend less than £5000 without shareholder authorization. Compa-
nies Act § 378 (“Authorisation under this Part is not needed for a donation except to the
extent that the total amount of—(a) that donation, and (b) other relevant donations made
in the period of 12 months ending with the date on which that donation is made, exceeds
£5,000.”); see also Explanatory Notes to Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, ¶ 612, http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/acts/acts2006/en/ukpgaen_20060046_en.pdf (“[A] company need not seek prior
shareholder consent for a donation to a political party or organisation unless the aggregate
amount of the donation . . . in the previous 12 months exceeds £5,000.”). Because share-
holder vote was not legally required for small amounts, corporate political donations below
£5000 have no accompanying shareholder authorization.
84. Companies Act § 366(1)–(2).
85. Compare Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, sched. 19
(requiring yearly authorization), with Companies Act § 368(1) (allowing authorizations for
up to four years).
86. Companies Act § 369; see also Corporate Briefing, The Companies Act 2006: Political
Donation, TRAVERS SMITH, (Nov. 2007), http://www.traverssmith.com/assets/pdf/Le-
gal_Briefings/companies_act_2006_-_political_donations_-_nov_2007.pdf (“[D]irectors in
default of the requirement for authorisation are jointly and severally liable to pay to the
company the amount of the unauthorised donation or expenditure, with interest, and also
to compensate the company for any loss or damage sustained by it as a result of the
unauthorised donation or expenditure having been made.”). The interest rate charged on
unauthorized political expenditures is 8% per annum. Companies (Interest Rate for
Unauthorised Political Donation or Expenditure) Regulations, 2007, S.I. No. 2007/2242,
art. 2 (U.K.).
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more in the period of 2000–2010.87 However, as discussed in more
detail below,88 this practice had a few notable exceptions. Some com-
panies spent without authorization from shareholders, and sharehold-
ers refused to endorse a shareholder-sponsored political budget in
one company.89
The following is a snapshot of how the British system works. At
the annual general meeting when the shareholders vote on reelecting
the board or choosing auditors, in many firms, shareholders also vote
on future corporate political spending.90 In other words, a resolution
to authorize future political spending is often among a dozen resolu-
tions on a British proxy statement. British shareholders do not typi-
cally approve each and every individual political donation, nor do they
typically get an opportunity to specify which political party should be
supported.91 Instead, the managers request a generic political budget
for one year to four years of £100,000, for example, and the share-
87. See infra Exhibit 4.
88. See infra Part III.7–8.
89. Only BAA PLC’s shareholders voted against a proposal for political expenditure.
BAA PLC: Result of AGM, FE INVESTEGATE (Aug. 6, 2004), http://www.investegate.co.uk/
Article.aspx?id=20040806144602P47C0 [hereinafter BAA PLC: Result of AGM] (“All the res-
olutions submitted to BAA’s Annual General Meeting on 27 July were passed by sharehold-
ers with the exception of resolution 15 (increase in the authority to make political
donations).”); see also Mitchells & Butlers PLC: Result of AGM, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
(Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/
market-news-detail.html?announcementId=10357973 [hereinafter Mitchells & Butlers PLC:
Result of AGM] (showing that only 40.68% of total outstanding shares were voted in favor of
authorizing the political budget while the remaining shareholders abstained from voting;
nonetheless, this budget passed handily 87% against 13% among those who voted).
90. See, e.g., Notice of BP Annual General Meeting 2011, BP, 3 (Feb. 25, 2011), http://
www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/
set_investors/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/BP_notice_of_meeting_2011.pdf
(introducing Resolution 21 to seek authority from shareholders to spend £400,000 on po-
litical donations).
91. However, one firm, Caledonia Investments PLC, indicated for several consecutive
years which political party it intended to benefit, and the company sought and received
shareholder authorization to give £75,000 to the Conservative Party for two years. Caledonia
Investments PLC: Letter from the Chairman and Notice of 2008 Annual General Meeting, CALEDO-
NIA INVESTMENTS, 9 (June 12, 2008), http://www.caledonia.com/docs/AGM08.pdf (“Au-
thority is . . . being requested to make donations of up to £75,000 . . . to enable the
Company to assist the Conservative Party . . . in the approach to the next general elec-
tion.”); see also Caledonia Investments plc: Results of Annual General Meeting, CALEDONIA INVEST-
MENTS, 1 (July 29, 2008), http://www.caledonia.com/docs/Result%20of%20AGM%20
2008.pdf; Richard Wachman, Caledonia Set for Revolt on Plan to Donate to the Tories, OBSERVER
(U.K.), July 19, 2009, Business, at 3 (“Caledonia Investments has been heavily criticised by
Pirc, the shareholder lobby group, for proposing to donate £75,000 to the Conservative
party.”).
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holders give an up or down vote.92 Shareholders may also abstain.93
Directors cannot spend the money if they lose the vote and are liable
to the corporation for the cost of the unauthorized expenditures and
for any resulting damages if they spend this money on politics without
shareholder authorization.94
The applicability of the Companies Act’s political spending provi-
sions for multinational corporations is fact specific and depends in
large part on whether they are registered in the United Kingdom.
Under the Companies Act, a “company” is defined as one “formed
and registered under this Act.”95 As for “companies incorporated
outside the United Kingdom,”96 separate provisions govern their con-
duct.97 Overseas companies may be subject to U.K. reporting require-
ments98 and to certain U.K. rules on contract execution, seals, and
pre-incorporation liability.99 Only companies registered or incorpo-
rated in the United Kingdom may donate to U.K. candidates.100 Thus,
multinational corporations may spend in U.K. elections if they have a
registered arm doing business in the United Kingdom.101 Meanwhile,
the Companies Act covers political spending by a U.K. company
outside the United Kingdom. Indeed, after 2008, the shareholder ap-
proval requirements attach to election to public office in any EU
member state.102
92. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 366(2)(a) (U.K.) (“[The donation or expenditure
must be authorized] by a resolution of the members of the company.”); id. § 367(5) (“The
resolution must be expressed in general terms . . . and must not purport to authorise
particular donations or expenditure.”).
93. See, e.g., Mitchells & Butlers PLC: Result of AGM, supra note 89 (reporting percent-
age of votes made for, against, or abstaining resolutions during Mitchells & Butlers’ Annual
General Meeting held on January 28, 2010).
94. Companies Act §§ 366, 369.
95. Id. § 1(1).
96. Id. § 1(3).
97. Id. §§ 1044–1059 (regarding “overseas companies”).
98. Id. § 1049(1)–(2).
99. Id. § 1045(1).
100. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 54(2)(b), sched.
19 (U.K.).
101. Id. § 54(2)(b)(ii); see Julian Glover, Explained: Political Donations, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 29, 2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/jan/29/enron.politics1
(“Global companies with UK subsiduaries [sic] - such as Enron - can still make donations
provided they make them through their UK arm.”).
102. Companies Act § 363(3); see The 2011 AGM, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER
LLP, 21 (Dec. 2010), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/dec10/29290.
pdf (reporting that “[f]rom 1 October 2008, the scope of statutory control was extended to
donations to, and expenditure on, independent candidates at any election to public office
in the UK or any EU member state—previous rules applied only to support for political
parties and organizations”).
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Finally, the Companies Act has exempted media corporations
from shareholder authorization requirements since 2007.103 This me-
dia exemption has a small impact on the data we studied, as this ex-
emption only applied to three of the seventeen years we examined.104
But going forward, this exemption may impact future studies of corpo-
rate political spending in the United Kingdom.
2. The Motivation for the U.K. Reform: The “Honours” and
“Sleaze” Scandals
A partial history of U.K. party finances can be found in the Ex-
planatory Notes from Parliament that accompanies the PPERA.105
Before 2000, the law governing British elections dated back to 1884
and had not kept pace with the fact that political party spending was a
driving force in parliamentary elections.106 The PPERA of 2000
brought the election code up to date to focus on party financing. The
2000 Amendments also had antecedents in bills that had been pro-
posed over a decade earlier to give shareholders more oversight on
political spending.107
103. The Companies (Political Expenditure Exemption) Order, 2007, S.I. 2007/2081
(U.K.); see Political Donations and Expenditure, DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, http://
www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-law/company-and-partnership-law/company-law/com-
pany-law-faqs/political-donations-and-expenditure (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (“The [Com-
panies (Political Expenditure Exemption) Order 2007] exempts companies whose
ordinary business includes the publication of news (such as newspapers, and other publish-
ing or media-related companies) from having to seek shareholder authorisation in order
to prepare, publish, or disseminate material of a political nature. This is because it would
be impractical for them to have to comply with the provisions on political expenditure in
Part 14 of the Companies Act 2006 for something which is within the ordinary course of
their business.”).
104. Likewise, ever since the Federal Election Campaign Act in the 1970s, media com-
panies are generally exempt from the U.S. federal campaign finance restrictions that apply
to other corporations. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(b)(i) (2006) (originally enacted as Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301(f), 86 Stat. 3, 11–12, amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-225, § 201(5), 88
Stat. 1163, 1274).
105. Explanatory Notes to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Bill,
1999–2000, H.C. Bill [34] cls. 12–24 (U.K.), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-of-
fice.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/034/en/00034x—.htm.
106. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 72, at 8 (“Party funding was very lightly regulated
before the PPERA [of 2000].”).
107. U.K. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., URN 99/757, POLITICAL DONATIONS BY COMPANIES
¶ 4.15 (1999) [hereinafter POLITICAL DONATIONS BY COMPANIES], available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20000817034025/www.dti.gov.uk/cld/donation.pdf (“[T]he amend-
ment moved by Lord Williams of Elvel at Committee stage in the Lords during the passage
of the Companies Act 1989 . . . would have required that, where a directors’ report dis-
closed that political donations had been made, that part of the report should not be
signed, but should be put to the general meeting for approval by ordinary resolution. This
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The 2000 Amendments to the Companies Act came about as a
direct response to the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in
Public Life.108 Lord Neill of Bladen, who chaired this Parliamentary
Committee, explained the need for the new approach:
Many members of the public believe that the policies of the
major political parties have been influenced by large donors, while
ignorance about the sources of funding has fostered suspicion. We
are, therefore, convinced that a fundamentally new framework is
needed to provide public confidence for the future, to meet the
needs of modern politics and to bring the United Kingdom into
line with best practice in other mature democracies.109
The Neill Committee recommended 100 changes to British elec-
tions law,110 including that a company wishing to make a donation to
a political party should have the prior authority of its shareholders.111
This required Parliament to amend not only the election law, but also
the Companies Act, which is precisely what the PPERA did.
In the United States, campaign finance reforms typically come on
the heels of political scandals, and many of the biggest U.S. political
scandals have at their heart a corporate scandal.112 Like the United
would give shareholders a right to vote on political donations, but would not give them the
power to undo such donations once they had been made. . . . [S]hareholders can already
make their views known to directors, by, for example, formally putting the question of
donations on the agenda of a general meeting . . . .”).
108. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FIFTH REPORT, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC
LIFE, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1998, Cm. 4057-I (U.K.),
available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4057/volume-
1/volume-1.pdf (introductory letter of Lord Neill of Bladen) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON
STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1]; see generally SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, THE FUNDING
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLA-
TION IN RESPONSE TO THE FIFTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE,
1999, Cm. 4413 (U.K.), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/docu-
ment/cm44/4413/4413.htm (recommending limits on political campaign spending).
109. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1, supra note 108, at iii.
110. Id. at 4–14; Lori A. Ringhand, Concepts of Equality in British Election Financing Reform
Proposals, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 256 (2002).
111. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1, supra note 108, at 86–87.
112. The 1907 Tillman Act followed after the public discovered in 1905 that insurance
companies had given vast sums of money to the Republican Party using policy holder
money, including some donations during the 1904 re-election of Theodore Roosevelt. See
Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law,
92 GEO. L.J. 871, 891–94, 914–15 (2004) (discussing one insurance executive involved in
the 1905 scandal that was charged with grand larceny, but the New York courts threw out
the criminal charges). Following the Teapot Dome scandal, a pay-to-play scheme where oil
companies gave payoffs to federal officials in exchange for oil leases, the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925 expanded the federal disclosure requirements. Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed 1971); see Phillip Payne, What Was Teapot
Dome?, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (July 8, 2002), http://hnn.us/articles/550.html (explain-
ing the high profile bribery case known as the Teapot Dome scandal). The Watergate
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States, the United Kingdom has had its share of campaign finance
scandals which generated reforms like the 2000 Amendments to the
Companies Act discussed here. During a series of “honours” scandals
in the United Kingdom, the press alleged that a particular person re-
ceived a knighthood or other title because they or their company gave
generously to a political party.113 The British press has colloquially de-
nominated political corruption as “sleaze.”114 One notable example of
“sleaze” in U.K. corporate political spending involved Bernie Eccle-
stone of Formula One racing who made his fortune through the pri-
vate companies that run the sport.115 Mr. Ecclestone donated
investigations revealed that oil companies among others were giving large, illegal, and se-
cretive contributions to Nixon’s Committee to Re-Elect the President (“CREEP”). MAR-
SHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 158–59 (1980) (listing secret
political contributions from oil companies including over $1 million from Gulf Oil);
MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE WATERGATE CRISIS 23 (1999) (listing airlines, a tire company,
and oil companies as illegal corporate campaign donors); Trifin Roule, Oil Crimes, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 583, 584 (Lawrence M. Salinger ed.,
2005) (listing political contributions of $100,000 from several oil companies to Richard
Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign); Watergate Tapes: Milk and Money, WASH. POST, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/watergate/haldeman2.htm (last visited
Oct. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Milk and Money] (“The milk producers contributed more than
$1 million to the president’s re-election campaign and the President then allowed a higher
parity level for milk and dairy products.”); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE:
THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 435 (1990) (listing corporations as breaking the cam-
paign finance laws during Nixon’s administration including, among others, 3M, Carnation
Company, and the American Ship Building Company).
113. See, e.g., Stephen Castle & Nick Cohen, Who Pays the Piper?, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 20, 1993, at 18 (“Seventeen of the 27 industrialists the Thatcher govern-
ments turned into peers were connected to companies that had given money to the Con-
servative Party and Tory-supporting organisations. A total of 68 knighthoods went to
industrialists from companies that were Tory donors. The industrialists from contributing
companies elevated during the Thatcher years included Sir James Hanson, chairman of
Hanson plc, and Sir Gordon White, chairman of Hanson Industries, and Sir Hector Laing,
president of United Biscuits, who all received peerages. United Biscuits is the Tories largest
commercial donor since 1979, and Hanson is the second largest. Sir Charles Forte, from
the Forte group, the Conservatives ninth largest industrial donor was also enobled. Glaxo,
the 10th largest donor saw its Paul Girolami and Anthony Bide knighted.”).
114. See, e.g., Roger Mortimore, Public Perceptions of Sleaze in Britain, 48 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFS. 579, 582 (1995) (“The British media has kept up an almost constant barrage of scan-
dal stories since the autumn of 1992. A few of the allegations fall clearly within strict defini-
tions of sleaze or corruption . . . .”); see also Sleaze Reference, GLOSSARY.COM, http://www.
glossary.com/reference.php?q=Sleaze (“A number of political scandals in the 1980s and
1990s created the impression of what was described in the British Press as ‘sleaze’: a per-
ception that the then Conservative government was associated with political corruption
and hypocrisy.”).
115. David Leppard et al., Helping Hand?, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 1997; see
Patrick Hennessy, The Ecclestone Affair: Labour’s First Funding Scandal, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 12,
2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/3179722/The-Eccle-
stone-Affair-Labours-first-funding-scandal.html (discussing Bernie Ecclestone’s one million
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£1 million to the Labour Party in January 1997.116 In October of that
year, he met informally with Tony Blair, then Britain’s Prime Minis-
ter.117 Two weeks later, the government announced a proposal to ex-
empt Formula One racing from the blanket tobacco sponsorship ban
applicable in all other sporting events.118 Amid the public firestorm
that ultimately followed, Tony Blair issued a public apology.119
Furthermore, other allegations of a pay-to-play culture in Parlia-
ment arose.120 As a researcher at the House of Commons explained
the history of political funding before the 2000 amendments:
The main objections to the [pre-2000] system, where party finances
are largely free from any statutory regulation, revolve around suspi-
cions that financial considerations can buy undue influence and
improper access . . . . [T]he issues perceived as causing most con-
cern . . .[include] large donations from individuals and companies,
and, more specifically, the correlation between donations and ac-
cess to Ministers, influence on policy, favourable commercial con-
siderations, and the receipt of honours or other personal
appointments . . . .121
pound donation in 1997 to Britain’s Labour Party, which was only made public after Mr.
Ecclestone’s Formula One company was lucratively made exempt to a tobacco advertising
ban).
116. STUART WILKS-HEEG & STEPHEN CRONE, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT, FUNDING POLITICAL
PARTIES IN GREAT BRITAIN: A PATHWAY TO REFORM 15 (2010), available at http://partyfund-
ingreform.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/party_funding_web.pdf (“Labour pledged to
tackle ‘sleaze’, but quickly became blighted by the Ecclestone Affair (in which a £1 million
donation to Labour from the former chairman and Chief Executive of Formula 1 allegedly
led to a change in government policy).”).
117. Lisa E. Klein, On the Brink of Reform: Political Party Funding in Britain, 31 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1999).
118. Id. at 6–7.
119. Michael White, Blair: I Can Still Be Trusted, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 1997), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/politics/1997/nov/17/labour.uk; see Klein, supra note 117, at 7 (“Tony
Blair made and extraordinary television appearance to explain the affair and to apologize
for the way it had been handled.”); Hennessy, supra note 115 (“[T]he former prime minis-
ter [Tony Blair] used an interview . . . on [a] BBC [show] . . . to apologise for the govern-
ment’s handling of the issue.”).
120. ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 40 (John Wiley &
Sons, 4th ed. 2008) (“One of the issues that dominated the 1997 general election in the
UK was ‘sleaze.’ Numerous Members of Parliament of the incumbent Conservative admin-
istration had, or were alleged to have, a range of consultancies and relationships with busi-
ness that compromised their political work . . . . Labour made a manifesto pledge that, if
elected, they would appoint a commission to study the funding of political parties in the
UK. Once elected, they were good to their word, and the Committee on Standards in
Public Life, chaired by a senior lawyer, Lord Neill, began work.”).
121. Aileen Walker, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Bill – Donations 9
(House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 00/2, 2000), available at http://www.
parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-002.pdf.
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Some of the pre-2000 critiques focused on the democratic
problems engendered by the lack of transparency in political party
funding. For instance, British Home Secretary Jack Straw complained
in 1999, “[f]or too long public confidence in the political system has
been undermined by the absence of clear, fair and open statutory con-
trols on how political parties are funded.”122
Before the 2000 Amendments, corporate governance experts also
raised concerns about corporate political expenditures in the United
Kingdom. For example, Anne Simpson from Pensions and Investment
Research Consultants (“PIRC”), stated in her testimony before the
Neill Committee in 1998, that corporate political spending raised clas-
sic corporate agency problems between beneficial owners and day-to-
day managers:
Our other main point is accountability. When the directors
decide to make a corporate donation, that is made from share-
holder funds . . . . In other words, the majority of shareholders in
British companies are institutions such as pension funds and insur-
ance companies who are investing on behalf of others – [sic] they
are investing the public’s money by and large. We therefore think
it is absolutely essential that the directors seek approval from share-
holders for donations that they wish to make from shareholders’
funds.123
In 1999, the U.K. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ste-
phen Byers echoed this concern about directors using investors’ funds
without accountability: “In recent years there has been growing con-
cern about directors’ accountability to shareholders in relation to po-
litical donations by companies. This concern is due in part to the
scope for conflict between a director’s personal wishes or interests and
his duty to the company.”124
The main objective of the Companies Act’s 2000 Amendments
concerning corporate political spending was to address these agency
problems among managers who had the power to spend corporate
money on politics and the heterogeneous, dispersed shareholders un-
derwriting the expenditures.
122. David Hencke, Straw Caps Election Spending, GUARDIAN (London), July 28, 1999, at
2 (quoting Mr. Straw’s statements at the House of Commons).
123. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FIFTH REPORT, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC
LIFE, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1998, Cm. 4057-II, ¶
3750 (U.K.), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/
4057/volume-2/volume-2.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 2]
(statement of Anne Simpson, Joint Managing Dir., Pensions & Inv. Research Consultants
Ltd.).
124. POLITICAL DONATIONS BY COMPANIES, supra note 107, ¶ 1.2.
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III. Data and Analysis
Below, we examine what happened in the United Kingdom both
before and after the 2000 Amendments to the Companies Act. First,
we found that after the Amendments, the transparency and public ac-
cess to information about corporate political spending increased
markedly for both voters and investors. After 2001, the public can
readily find this information online. This data reveals that forty-nine
publicly traded corporations stopped spending after the 2000 Amend-
ments. But, at the same time, new corporations began spending. Also,
reported spending by privately held companies jumped markedly in
the 2000–2010 period, compared with the 1993–1999 period.
We also found that management-proposed political budgets were
nearly universally approved by shareholders. However, we noted that
the most common political budgets proposed were modest (£50,000
or £100,000) and that in most cases companies spent far less than
these political budgets. But of course, there were a few examples of
what appear to be overspending by a few publicly traded companies,
far in excess of the shareholder-approved corporate political budgets.
A. Data Sources
We compiled a robust data set of not only the political spending
by companies that were subject to the U.K. Companies Act from
2001–2010, but also political spending by companies in the previous
decade from 1993–2000. We collected the data from the British Elec-
toral Commission125 and the Labour Research Department,126 an or-
ganization that has tracked corporate political spending in the United
Kingdom for decades.127 We then cross-verified this raw data with vari-
ous newspaper accounts of political expenditures.128 From PIRC, we
125. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk (last visited Oct.
11, 2011).
126. See LABOUR RES. DEP’T, http://www.lrd.org.uk (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
127. See About the Labour Research Department, LABOUR RES. DEP’T http://www.lrdpublica-
tions.org.uk/old_article.php?obj=19577 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (“Founded in July 1912
LRD has maintained the principles embodied in its initial statement [promoting and carry-
ing out research into problems of importance to the labour, to supply information, and to
issue publications] throughout the last 95 years, and provided its affiliates with a wealth of
information and research.”); Charles Phillip Harris, Lobbying and Public Affairs in the UK:
The Relationship to Political Marketing 476–80 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Manchester Metropolitan University), available at http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/bit-
stream/handle/10523/1474/HarrisCPmin.pdf (utilizing the same data source for a doc-
toral thesis).
128. E.g., Andrew Grice, Tory Business Donations Slump to All-Time Low, INDEPENDENT
(London), Nov. 30, 1999, at 5 (reporting declining corporate donations to the Conserva-
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also collected detailed records of management proposals that seek
shareholder votes to authorize corporate political budgets in publicly
traded companies, including the total number of shares voted, the
percentage of shareholders who cast for or against votes, and the size
of political budgets that managers propose for shareholder ap-
proval.129 We used PIRC as a data source because it was one of the few
groups to track political data from U.K. companies from the 1990s
through the present day.130 We were able to compare how much
shareholders authorized companies to spend with how much compa-
nies actually spent. And for the first time, we observed the broader
trends of corporate political spenders in the United Kingdom from
1993–2010, including a few companies who appear to be flouting the
spirit, if not the letter, of the law.
Data on political spending in the United Kingdom was theoreti-
cally available starting in 1967. The Companies Act of 1967 imposed a
duty on companies to declare political donations in the company’s
annual report over £50, which was subsequently increased to £200 in
1980.131 However, this information was not systematically reported or
aggregated.132 Only with the advent of the Companies Act of 2000—
which required dual reporting both by the Electoral Commission to
the public and by individual companies to their investors133—and
tive Party based on a survey from the Labour Research Department); Tory Corporate Dona-
tions Plummet, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/
543358.stm (reporting a slump in donations from corporations to the Tories after the re-
lease of a survey from the Labour Research Department). But see, e.g., The New Establish-
ment: A New Corporatism, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 48 (reporting new ties between the
Labour Party and big business in England).
129. See PENSIONS INV. RES. CONSULTANTS (PIRC), http://www.pirc.co.uk/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2011).
130. Id. (“Since 1986, [PIRC] has been the pioneer and champion of good corporate
governance within the UK.”); COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1, supra note 108, ¶
6.25 (listing PIRC as an organization that has compiled political donations data for many
years).
131. Companies Act, 1967, c. 81, § 19(1) (U.K.); COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC
LIFE 1, supra note 108, ¶ 6.24; see also Walker, supra note 121, at 30 (“The Companies Act
1967 imposed a duty on companies to declare in the directors’ report any political dona-
tions above a certain limit. Initially the limit was £50 but this was increased to £200 in 1980.
There is no central record of such donations, although work is carried out by various or-
ganisations (notably the Labour Research Department and Pensions and Investment Re-
search Consultants) to try to collate the information from individual companies’ reports.”
(citation omitted)).
132. See COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1, supra note 108, ¶ 6.25 (“[T]here is
no central record of the companies that give political donations. That information is held
in the reports of over one million registered UK companies.”).
133. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–140, sched.
19 (U.K.); see also Explanatory Notes to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums
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with technological advances like the Internet, has the tracking of po-
litical spending by U.K. companies become widely accessible to the
public and researchers alike. Before 2000, the lack of readily accessi-
ble data on corporate political spending led the U.K. press to com-
plain about the lack of transparency around party financing in the
1990s, including reports of millions of pounds from unnamed
sources.134
We hasten to add that our manual match between the spender
and the proposal firms might not be complete, particularly if a firm
changes its name due to reorganization or merger deals, or if the Elec-
toral Commission reports the names of subsidiaries as donors whereas
the shareholder authorization falls under the names of the publicly
traded firms. With future work, we will confirm the identities of addi-
tional publicly traded spenders with (or without) proper shareholder
authorization.
B. British Experience After Reform
The twin concerns about transparency and accountability moti-
vated the United Kingdom to change their corporate and election
laws in 2000.135 But has this change in the law achieved its goals of
providing more transparency and accountability to corporate political
spending? After its first decade (2000–2010), it appears that the an-
swer is a qualified yes. Spending was far more transparent from the
point of view of investors and voters during the 2001–2010 period,
compared with the previous 1993–2000 period when the source of
millions of pounds in party coffers was unexplained.136 The corporate
political budgets sought and spent by U.K. companies have typically
Act, 2000, c. 41, ¶ 11, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/notes/division/2/9
(“Part IX [of PPERA] introduces a requirement that shareholder consent must be ob-
tained before a company makes a donation to a political party or incurs political expendi-
ture. It also requires the disclosure of political expenditure in directors’ annual reports to
shareholders.”).
134. Rosie Waterhouse, Source of Pounds 15m in Donations to Tory Party Not Disclosed, IN-
DEPENDENT (London), June 16, 1993, at 3 (“The source of more than . . . 15 [million
pounds] in donations to the Conservative Party made before the 1992 general election
remains a mystery despite an exhaustive search of the accounts of 5,000 companies to see if
they declared political donations last year.”).
135. See supra Part II.B.2.
136. Compare the transparency any British voter can find by looking at the British
Electoral Commission’s Party Finance Analysis for the year 2011, Party Finance Analysis,
ELECTORAL COMMISSION, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/party-finance/party-fi-
nance-analysis (last visited Oct. 2, 2011), with the pre-2000 situation described by the press
in Waterhouse, supra note 134, where £15 million in the Tories’ coffers could not be attrib-
uted to a source.
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been modest following the 2000 Amendments. One explanation for
this self-restraint is that certain institutional investors resist corporate
political activity.
1. Disclosure of U.K. Corporate Political Spending
After the 2000 Amendments, companies have given detailed ac-
counts of their political donations in their annual reports to investors.
For example, British American Tobacco reported its political
activities:
No donation was made in 2010 to any political party registered in
the UK under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act
2000. Subsidiaries of the Company in Australia, Canada and the
Solomon Islands made contributions to non-EU political parties in
their respective countries of incorporation totalling £114,245
(2009: £76,969).137
Tesco PLC reported its political spending to shareholders thusly
“[d]uring the year, the Group made contributions of £49,365 (2009 –
£55,468) in the form of sponsorship for political events: Labour Party
£15,000; Liberal Democrat Party £6,300; Conservative Party £8,384;
SNP [Scottish National Party] £5,500; Plaid Cymru £2,000; trade un-
ions £12,181.”138 ITV PLC made similarly detailed accounts, reporting
“[d]uring the year the Group made the following payments totalling
[sic] £7,968 (2007: £9,110): Labour Party £3,920; Conservative Party
£685; Liberal Democrat Party £2,086 and Plaid Cymru Party
£1,277.”139 All in all, reporting companies in the United Kingdom ac-
count for their political spending down to the pound.
2. Actual Spending by U.K. Corporations Post-2000
Some well-known, publicly traded U.K. companies stopped
spending after the 2000 Amendments. A study of corporate donations
from 1987–1988 showed that twenty-eight companies had given
£50,000 or more in political contributions.140 In contrast, a recent
137. BRITISH AM. TOBACCO, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 64 (2010), available at http://www.
bat.com/ar/2010/downloads/index.html (click on “Complete Annual Report 2010,”
check the box next to “Annual Report 2010,” and click on “Download”).
138. TESCO PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2010, at 45 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.scribd.com/doc/67212115/6/General-information.
139. ITV PLC, REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2008, at 45 (2008), available at http://
2008.itv.ar.ry.com/action/printBasket/?sectionId=26443; see also ITV PLC, REPORT AND AC-
COUNTS 2010, at 45 (2010), available at http://www.itvplc.com/files/financialreport/
43094/ITV_R_A_2010.pdf (reporting zero political expenditures for 2009 and 2010).
140. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Trends in British Party Funding 1983–1987, 42 PARLIA-
MENTARY AFF. 197, 209 (1989) (listing as £50,000 or over donors: George Weston Holdings,
British & Commonwealth Holdings, Taylor Woodrow, Rugarth Investment Trust, Hanson
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN208.txt unknown Seq: 33 22-FEB-12 16:30
Fall 2011] CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 557
post-2000 sampling of the biggest U.K. firms reveals that some of the
same companies that used to give at £50,000 or more have decided to
forego political spending altogether. For example, Rolls Royce was
once a major political donor in the 1980s.141 But today, Rolls Royce
has a stated policy against political spending.142 This change appears
in their 2001 annual report.143 GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) also fol-
lowed a similar pattern of spending big in the 1980s144 but had
adopted policies against political contributions in the new millen-
nium. As GSK explains:
GSK has adopted a global policy ending the provision of political
contributions in any market in which the company operates . . . .
However, in order to protect GSK from any inadvertent violation of
the U.K. law (where political contributions are defined very
broadly) GSK will continue to seek shareholder approval for politi-
cal contributions within the EU.145
British Airways, a former big spender,146 has also left the political
arena. British Airways states in its most recent annual report: “The
Company does not make political donations or incur political expen-
diture within the ordinary meaning of those words and has no inten-
Trust, P & O, United Biscuits, Allied Lyons, Trafalgar House, Plessey, Whitbread, Consoli-
dated Goldfields, Racal, Guardian Royal Exchange, Sun Alliance, Willis Faber, Hambros,
General Accident, Newarthill, Trust House Forte, Baring, British Airways, General Electric,
Glaxo Holdings, Rolls Royce, Royal Insurance, Unigate, and Williams Holdings); see also
KEITH EWING, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN BRITAIN 39 (1987) (citing Labour Re-
search statistics that companies gave the Conservative Party £1.6 million in 1979; £1.4 mil-
lion in 1980; £1.4 million in 1981; £1.4 million in 1982, and £2.7 million in 1983); Walker,
supra note 121, at 32 (“The LRD [Labor Research Department] told [the Neill Committee]
that in the mid 1980s they would expect to find some 50 per cent of Conservative Party
income coming from corporate sources, whereas now the party admits the figure is down
to 20 per cent.”).
141. Pinto-Duschinsky, supra note 140, at 219 (listing Rolls Royce as a £50,000 donor).
142. ROLLS-ROYCE GRP. PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 80 (2010), available at http://
www.rolls-royce.com/reports/2010/img/downloads/RR_full_AR_2010.pdf (“In line with
its established policy, the [Rolls-Royce] Group made no political donations pursuant to the
authority granted at the 2010 AGM.”).
143. ROLLS-ROYCE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 26 (2001), available at http://
195.149.127.16/Images/annual_report2001_tcm92-27357.pdf.
144. Pinto-Duschinsky, supra note 140, at 209 (listing Glaxo Holdings as a £50,000
donor).
145. Political Contributions, GLAXOSMITHKLINE, 2 (2009), http://www.gsk.com/about/
corp-gov/Policy-Political-Contributions.pdf. It is worth noting that GSK continues to spend
on politics in the United States despite their stated global policy against it. See GLAXOS-
MITHKLINE, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 70 (2008), available at http://www.gsk.com/investors/
reps08/GSK-Report-2008-full.pdf (“In 2008, a total of £539,359 (£522,172 in 2007) was
donated to political organisations by the GSK PAC.”).
146. Pinto-Duschinsky, supra note 140, at 209 (listing British Airways as a £50,000
donor).
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tion of doing so. The amount of political donations made and
political expenditure incurred in the year to 31 March 2010 was £nil
(2009: £nil).”147
Even BP (formerly known as “British Petroleum”), which, as de-
tailed below, sought one of the largest shareholder authorizations for
political spending in the United Kingdom, has a stated policy against
political spending.148
In our dataset, forty-nine companies that used to make political
expenditures in the 1990s stopped entirely after 2000, all of which are
publicly traded. However, not every British company has foregone
large political expenditures.149 While the current Committee on Stan-
dards in Public Life (the successor to the Neill Committee) claimed
that “[d]onations from public companies have also apparently de-
clined since the introduction in 2000 of the requirement for trans-
parency and prior shareholder approval,”150 our data does not
support this conclusion. In our data, corporate political spending by
publicly traded companies remained relatively stable by aggregate
during the 1993–2010 period. Overall, our data set demonstrates that
the spending by other publicly traded companies made up for de-
creased spending by the older cadre of spenders who dropped out of
the donor pool, as Exhibit 2 below shows.151
Furthermore, as Exhibit 2 demonstrates, spending by privately
held (unlisted) companies rose dramatically in the 2001–2010 period
147. BRITISH AIRWAYS, 2009/10 ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS, at 48 (2010), available
at http://www.britishairways.com/cms/global/microsites/ba_reports0910/pdfs/BA_AR_
2010.pdf; see also BRITISH AIRWAYS, 2008/09 ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS, at 57 (2009),
available at http://www.britishairways.com/cms/global/microsites/ba_reports0809/pdfs/
BA_AR_2008_09.pdf (listing zero political expenditures for 2008).
148. BP, ANNUAL REPORT AND FORM 20-F, at 75 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.
bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/STAGING/com-
mon_assets/downloads/pdf/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F.pdf (“BP continues to
apply a policy that the group will not participate directly in party political activity or make
any political contributions, whether in cash or in kind.”); see also BRITISH LAND CO., AN-
NUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2010, at 62 (2010) available at http://www.britishland.com/
files/reports/2010_annual_report.pdf (“No contributions were made for political pur-
poses (2009:£nil).”).
149. See CO-OPERATIVE GRP., ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2008, at 36 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.co-operative.coop/Corporate/PDFs/Annual_Report_2008.pdf (“In 2008
an annual subscription of £476,000 (2007: £646,103) was made to the Co-operative Party
. . . .”).
150. COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, REVIEW OF PARTY FUNDING ISSUES AND QUES-
TIONS, ¶ 13 (Sept. 2010), http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/Library/Party_Funding_Is-
sues_and_Questions_Final.pdf.
151. See supra table accompanying note 58 (noting that general parliamentary elections
occurred in 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2010).
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compared with the period 1993–2000. Donations to the Conservative
Party from publicly held (listed) companies added up to £5.1 million
between 1993 and 2000 (inclusive), based on 188 total donations.
Comparable figures from unlisted companies totaled £4.9 million—
statistically indifferent from the listed donations during the same pe-
riod. However, after 2000, donations to the Conservative Party from
listed companies were almost £10 million, whereas unlisted donations
hit £20 million, a highly statistically significant increase.
Similarly, the total donations from listed companies to the La-
bour Party added up to £191,000 before 2000 and £674,406 after
2000, while the unlisted companies donated about £0.41 million and
£3.04 million before and after 2000, respectively.
We cannot conduct a controlled experiment to directly observe
donation migration from publicly traded firms to privately held firms
after the year 2000. We also cannot fully explain why private firms
amassed the lion’s share of political donations after the year 2000,
coinciding with the introduction of shareholder voting, as required by
the amended Companies Act. These observations suggest that the
Companies Act has exerted pressure on listed companies to refrain
from funding political parties, and we invite further studies to confirm
or refute this conjecture.
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3. Partisan Split in Corporate Spending
Both before and after the U.K. reform, most corporate money
has gone to the Conservative Party (also known as “the Tories”).152
Corporate spending in the United Kingdom favored the Tories by a
factor of ten to one compared with the Labour Party in the period of
1993–2010. The Labour Party has historically received substantially
less corporate money.153 During the period of 1993–2000, the Labour
Party received only twenty-seven corporate donations (from listed and
unlisted companies) totaling £603,038.154 In contrast, during the
same period, the Conservative Party received 539 donations, approxi-
mately £15.5 million from 169 companies.155 Our data also shows that
publicly traded companies have given very little to the Liberal Demo-
crats—a total of £178,999156 over the 1993–2010 period, compared
with nearly £1 million given to the Labour Party over the same time
period.157 However, privately held companies provided £4,711,073158
to the Liberal Democrats, more than the roughly £3 million given to
the Labour Party over the same period (1993–2010).159
After the 2000 amendments, the total company donations to the
Conservatives dwindled to £1.7 million in 2001 and £1.2 million in
2003.160 But corporate spending spiked during the most recent parlia-
mentary election in 2010, making up over one fifth of all party fund-
152. Press Release, Labour Research Dep’t, Tories Still Get Corporate Millions (June 2,
2001), available at http://www.lrd.org.uk/issue.php?pagid=1&issueid=362 (“The Conserva-
tive Party has received a total of £1.74 million in company donations since the last election
from 62 companies[, while] just 12 corporate donations [went] to Labour totalling
£191,500.”); Who’s Paying the Piper?, LABOUR RES., Oct. 2003, at 11 (noting that companies
gave £1,128,195 to the Conservative Party and £243,490 to the Labour Party in the
2002–2003 election cycle).
153. E.g., Sam Coates, Labour Donors Dying off But Conservatives in Rude Health, TIMES
(London), May 28, 2009, at 16 (“[T]he Conservatives continue to outstrip Labour in fun-
draising, receiving more than £4 million in donations [from individual donors] in the first
quarter of [2009.]”).
154. Authors’ own calculations for 1993–2000, based on data from PIRC and Labour
Research.
155. Id.
156. £196,014 if counting any donations reported to the British Electoral Commission
and £178,999 if counting only those £5,000 or larger. See Donations Advanced Search, ELEC-
TORAL COMMISSION, https://pefonline.electoralcommission.org.uk/Search/CommonRe-
turnsSearch.aspx?type=advDonationSearch (sorted by “Company” donations in the “Donor
status” field) (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Donations Advanced Search], for data
pertaining the period of 2001 to 2010.
157. See id. for data pertaining the period of 2001 to 2010.
158. £4,784,160 if counting smaller donations below £5,000.
159. See supra Exhibit 2.
160. See sources cited supra note 152.
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ing.161 Contemporaneous researchers have confirmed our findings on
the partisan split of political donations. Most recently, Dr. Richard
Williams found that company donations made up 26% of the Con-
servative Party’s donations from 2005–2010, while they made up just
5% of the Labour Party’s donations in the same period.162 Other re-
searchers have found that the donations to the Tories are particularly
concentrated when familial relations, as well as business relationships,
are considered in tandem.163
4. Proxy Votes to Authorize British Political Spending
PIRC, an independent British research and advisory firm that
tracks data on corporate governance for institutional investors,164 pro-
vided us with a dataset of proxy votes that authorized political spend-
ing by firms subject to the Companies Act.
Even before the changes in the Companies Act in 2000, which
made shareholder authorizations mandatory, there were a handful of
U.K. companies that put political donations to a shareholder vote. Ac-
cording to PIRC’s testimony to the Neill Committee in 1998:
PIRC considers that political gifts should be subject to annual
shareholder approval and has asked for this at all leading compa-
nies which make donations. According to our records, 19 compa-
nies have done this via some form of resolution to shareholders.
However, there are still many companies which do not seek ap-
proval from shareholders. By 1997 among the FTSE 350 [index],
23 companies had made political donations in each of the previous
six years without ever seeking shareholder approval, despite re-
quests to do so.165
161. UK GENERAL ELECTION 2010, supra note 8, at 20 (listing over £17 million in dona-
tions for the 2010 election to UK political parties came from companies).
162. Richard Williams, Pattern of Political Donations by Companies: Implications for the Regu-
lation of Donations and the Introduction of Cap on Individual Donations, 2, http://www.public-
standards.gov.uk/Library/Party_Funding___E17___R_Williams.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
163. Stephen Crone & Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Just 50 ‘Donor Groups’ Have Supplied over Half
of the Conservative Party’s Declared Donation Income in the Last Decade, a Fact Disguised by Legal
‘Fame Avoidance’ Techniques, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010), http://
blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/12/20/just-50-%E2%80%98donor-
groups%E2%80%99-have-supplied-over-half-of-the-conservative-party%E2%80%99s-de-
clared-donation-income-in-the-last-decade-a-fact-disguised-by-legal-%E2%80%98fame-
avoidance/.
164. See PENSIONS INV. RES. CONSULTANTS (PIRC), supra note 128 (“PIRC is the UK’s
leading independent research and advisory consultancy providing services to institutional
investors on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.”).
165. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 2, supra note 123, at 324 (opening state-
ment of Pensions & Inv. Research Consultants Ltd.); PIRC has continued to raise concerns
about the risks associated with partisan political spending. See London Borough of Croydon
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The PIRC data provided to the authors included resolutions dating
back to January 1, 2000 for 226 unique companies that complied with
the Companies Act—for a total of 853 management resolutions seek-
ing shareholder authorization of political spending from
2001–2010.166 As Exhibit 3 below shows, the PIRC data revealed that
most British companies that sought authorization from their share-
holders under the Companies Act from 2001–2010 sought relatively
modest political budgets.167 In our sample of 853 authorization votes,
the corporate political budgets sought by management ranged from
£5000 to £1.25 million.168 In our dataset from PIRC, the political
budget most frequently requested by management was £100,000 (270
authorizations) and the second most frequently requested was
£50,000 (209 authorizations). However, we found a few exceptions.
For example, Taylor Wimpey PLC requested a total of £500,000 for
the four-year period 2006–2010,169 and the Royal Bank of Scotland
Group requested £500,000 in 2006 and in 2010.170 Moreover, BP
Pension Fund: Proxy Voting Review April to June 2008, PENSIONS & INV. RES. CONSULTANTS
LTD., 19 (July 2008), available at http://www.croydon.gov.uk/contents/departments/de-
mocracy/pdf/596477/Votesapr08 (“The safest option for both companies and sharehold-
ers is simply to avoid these types of corporate [political] donations altogether. The view
could be taken that if managers feel sufficiently strongly, about a particular cause or group,
that they can spend their own money, rather than that of shareholders.”).
166. Our data might not be complete for 2010 as we acquired it from PIRC in May
2010.
167. For example, the resolution passed at AstraZeneca stated that the company could
“make donations to political parties; . . . make donations to political organisations other
than political parties; [and] incur political expenditure . . . not exceed[ing] in aggregate
$250,000 . . . .” ASTRAZENECA, ASTRAZENECA NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 2009 AND
SHAREHOLDERS’ CIRCULAR 6 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.astrazeneca.se/
_mshost2627214/content/resources/gUserfiles/5459543. Other companies had far more
modest political budgets. See, e.g., 3I GRP. PLC, NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 2007,
at 2 (May 9, 2007), available at http://www.3igroup.com/pdf/AGM_-_notice_of_AGM_
2007.pdf (requesting a political budget of £12,000 for a subsidiary); BALFOUR BEATTY, AN-
NUAL GENERAL MEETING 2009 AND SEPARATE CLASS MEETING OF PREFERENCE SHAREHOLDERS
4 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://www.balfourbeatty.com/files/events/2009/agm_2009_
notice.pdf (requesting a political budget of £25,000 for the coming year).
168. See infra Exhibit 3.
169. TAYLOR WOODROW PLC, 2006 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING AND DIVIDEND RE-INVEST-
MENT PLAN 3 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.taylorwimpeyplc.com/Resources/
Documents/InvestorRelations/AnnouncementsPresentations/TaylorWoodrowArchive/
2006_agm_and_shareholder_information.pdf (requesting authorization to donate up to
£250,000 to EU political organizations and to incur in up to £250,000 in EU political ex-
penditure); Taylor Woodrow plc, Annual General Meeting Outcome of Resolutions (May
3, 2006), available at http://www.taylorwimpeyplc.com/Resources/Documents/InvestorRe-
lations/AnnouncementsPresentations/TaylorWoodrowArchive/out-
come_of_resolutions_2006.pdf (stating the resolution passed).
170. ROYAL BANK OF SCOT. GRP. PLC, LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 9–10 (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://www.investors.rbs.com/download/standard/2010_AGM_Letter_to_Shareholders.
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sought authorization for £400,000 for itself and an additional
£400,000 for BP International Limited over a four-year period in
2007.171 And finally, British American Tobacco sought and received
an authorization for £1 million over a four-year period.172 But these
larger amounts were outliers. The total amount requested by all com-
panies in our U.K. sample provided by PIRC was £85.6 million.173 The
sample can be seen below in Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3: Management Proposals on Political Contributions
Average
Number of Amount
firms with Requested Minimum Maximum
Year proposals (£) Std. Dev. (£) (£)
2001 22 190,000 250,614 5,000 1,250,000
2002 84 123,299 148,879 5,000 1,250,000
2003 69 87,585 55,773 10,000 250,000
2004 74 104,054 146,291 5,000 1,250,000
2005 82 88,280 62,828 5,000 300,000
2006 95 85,840 80,589 5,000 500,000
2007 100 93,078 77,061 5,000 500,000
2008 123 95,488 73,892 5,000 500,000
2009 125 99,879 77,550 5,000 500,000
2010 79 107,532 90,312 5,000 500,000
Total 853 100,219 101,437 5,000 1,250,000
The modest size of typical U.K. budgets, which cluster around
£50,000 and £100,000, differs strikingly from corporate political
pdf (seeking renewal of authority previously approved by shareholders in 2006 to make
political donations of up to £500,000); Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. plc, Result of Annual
General Meeting (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://www.investors.rbs.com/download/
standard/03_-_Result_of_Annual_General_Meeting.pdf (authorization granted).
171. BP PLC, NOTICE OF BP ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 2007, at 10, 20 (Feb. 23, 2007),
available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/home_as-
sets/IC_SHMV07_BP_notice_of_meeting_2007.pdf (seeking authorization to make politi-
cal donations to a maximum of £400,000 for a four-year period).
172. BRITISH AM. TOBACCO, ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 2009, at 5 (Mar. 30, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO57YMK7/
$FILE/medMD7QJMDX.pdf?openelement (“At its Annual General Meeting in April 2005,
the Company was given authority to make donations to EU political organisations and
incur EU political expenditure . . . for a period of four years and [the authority] was
subject to caps of £1 million on donations to EU political organisations and £1 million on
political expenditure during that period.”).
173. The total of £85.6 million is derived by adding all the authorizations PIRC pro-
vided to the authors. However, one entry in the data was wrong by an order of magnitude.
An authorization listed at £1,800,000 was actually £180,000.
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spending in the 2010 U.S. election. For example, News Corp. gave
$1 million to the Republican Governors Association in the second
quarter of 2010.174 Also, in the 2010 U.S. federal election, corpora-
tions gave contributions to so-called “Super PACs” $1 million or even
$2 million at a time.175 It is difficult to know whether these million-
dollar corporate political expenditures in the United States are large
outliers or the norm because U.S. datasets lack uniform disclosure. So
while our datasets allow us to determine that a £1.25 million budget is
a large outlier in the United Kingdom, we cannot make a comparable
claim about the U.S. corporate political spending. Thus, we may be
comparing U.K. modest spending to uncommonly large U.S.
expenditures.
5. Shareholder Votes in United Kingdom Authorize Political
Spending
In our data, we found that from 2000 to 2010 shareholders in
U.K. companies authorized political budgets almost every time man-
agement proposed a political budget. Moreover, shareholders voted
in favor of management’s proposals overwhelmingly. On average, the
favorable votes accounted for 94% or higher of those who vote. How-
ever, the data also showed that large numbers of shareholders did not
participate in these votes 2000–2010.176 For example, in 2010, on aver-
174. Republican Governors Ass’n, IRS Form 8872, Political Organization Report of
Contributions and Expenditures (OMB No. 1545-1696) (2010), http://forms.irs.gov/polit-
icalOrgsSearch/search/Print.action?formId=53792&formType=E72 (listing donation from
News America Inc., otherwise known as News Corp., to the Republican Governors Associa-
tion at $1,000,000).
175. American Crossroads Contributors, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.),
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cycle=2010&cmte=C00487363 (last vis-
ited Oct.8, 2011) (listing a $2 million donation from Alliance Resource GP, LLC, to Ameri-
can Crossroads and $1 million donations from TRT Holdings, Inc., Southwest Louisiana
Land, LLC, and Dixie Rice Agricultural Co. to American Crossroads). There is no longer a
limit on contributions to organizations that make independent expenditures in federal
elections, because after Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit found that “the government has no
anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to an independent expenditure group
. . . .” SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553
(2010). The U.S. press has dubbed the large independent expenditure PACs, “Super
PACs.” E.g., Eduardo Porter, How the Big Money Finds a Way In, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 2011,
at SR12 (indicating that “[c]ompanies, unions and other interest groups poured about
$300 million into campaign ads in the 2010 Congressional elections,” funneling money
into independent groups called “Super PACs”); see Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER
RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2010 (“Techni-
cally known as independent expenditure-only committees, Super PACs may raise unlimited
sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and individuals, then spend unlim-
ited sums to overtly advocate for or against political candidates.”).
176. See infra Exhibit 4, Panel B.
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age 65.5% of all outstanding shares cast votes, meaning that the rest,
34.5%, completely abstained from voting on corporate political
budgets.
In addition, we noticed a greater percentage of shareholders en-
gaging on the issue of corporate political spending over time, starting
with a low of 42% participation in 2002 and peeking at 66.5% partici-
pation in 2009—dropping off just slightly in 2010 to 65.5%. These
increasing vote participation figures indicate that shareholder consent
is meaningful, since in most cases the total voting “yes” is larger than
those voting “no” and/or abstaining. Mitchells & Butlers plc provides
a rare counter example where the votes in favor were in the minority,
compared with those abstaining and votes in opposition.177
6. Shareholder Authorization Versus Actual Corporate Spending
One of the striking features of the data from the United King-
dom was that managers in U.K. firms often had shareholder-author-
ized political budgets, but those budgets were not spent. Between
2001 and 2010, publicly traded U.K. companies got the authority from
their shareholders to spend over £85.6 million.178 But the actual cor-
porate spending was roughly £42 million, and only £10.2 million of
that came from publicly traded companies.179
Exhibit 5 shows actual spending by U.K. companies. Most of the
spending comes from privately held corporations in the post-2000 pe-
riod. Put succinctly, the publicly traded U.K. companies had the au-
thority to spend more, yet did not. One explanation for this was
evident in the annual directors’ reports from these companies to the
shareholders. Many companies explained that they sought share-
177. Mitchells & Butlers PLC: Result of AGM, supra note 89 (showing only 40.68% of
outstanding shares were cast in favor of authorizing the political budget); see also Ben Grif-
fiths, Trinity Steps Back from Price War as Ad Revenues Recover, HERALD (Glasgow), May 7,
2004, at 29 (“Shareholders of Trinity Mirror sent a strong signal to the company’s board
yesterday with a hefty vote against resolutions allowing the newspaper publisher to make
political donations. Approximately a quarter of proxy voters refused to back two resolu-
tions seeking shareholder approval for political donations, while all other resolutions were
passed without difficulty.”).
178. See supra note 173.
179. The total of £41,971,619 is derived by adding the total donations from listed com-
panies to the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and other parties (£9,412,605,
£674,406, £137,607, and £7,504, respectively) and the total donations from unlisted compa-
nies to the same parties (£21,620,000, £3,044,354, £4,817,567, and £2,257,576, respectively)
between the years 2001 and 2010. See infra Exhibit 5.
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Exhibit 4: Shareholder Voting on Political Spending Proposals
Panel A: As a percentage of votes cast
Number Discrete
of For % Against % Abstain % %
Year proposals Average Average Average Average Total
2002 8 94.63% 4.69% 0.68% - 100.00%
2003 9 94.09% 3.43% 2.48% - 100.00%
2004 22 86.80% 8.32% 4.53% 0.36% 100.00%
2005 57 95.23% 2.35% 0.87% 1.49% 99.94%
2006 76 97.01% 2.23% 0.70% 0.09% 100.03%
2007 82 94.07% - 2.14% 0.16% 96.37%
2008 120 97.00% 2.37% 0.51% 0.13% 100.00%
2009 121 96.84% 1.98% 1.05% 0.13% 100.00%
2010 79 95.87% 2.51% 1.58% 0.04% 100.00%
Total 574 95.75% 2.74% 1.25% 0.26% 100.00%
Panel B: As a percentage of voting power (total common shares outstanding)
Number Discrete
of For % Against % Abstain % %
Year proposals Average Average Average Average Total
2002 7 39.76% 2.19% 0.46% - 42.41%
2003 9 46.05% 1.68% 1.67% - 49.40%
2004 20 49.56% 1.36% 0.55% 0.25% 51.72%
2005 57 59.01% 1.47% 0.57% 1.36% 62.41%
2006 74 60.76% 1.34% 0.44% 0.06% 62.61%
2007 79 57.62% 1.45% 0.77% 0.11% 59.95%
2008 118 61.11% 1.39% 0.33% 0.08% 66.50%
2009 110 64.40% 1.28% 0.74% 0.08% 66.50%
2010 69 62.99% 1.51% 0.95% 0.02% 65.47%
Total 543 60.29% 1.41% 0.62% 0.20% 62.52%
holder authorization as a protective measure to avoid inadvertent vio-
lation of the U.K. Companies Act.180
A sample of recent individual annual reports by top British firms
showed that, post-2000, many companies refrained from political
spending and had a stated policy against the practice. Yet, many firms
with this policy of not making political contributions sought authori-
zations as a precaution. For example, HMV, the music retailer, stated
in its most recent annual report: “It is Group policy not to make dona-
tions to political parties or independent election candidates and
therefore no political donations were made during the period.”181
Burberry, a British fashion house, also shared this approach noting,
180. E.g., HMV GRP., ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2010, at 49 (2010), available at
http://www.hmvgroup.com/~/media/Files/H/HMV-Group/Annual%20Reports/
hmv_annual-report-2010.pdf.
181. Id. at 48.
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“[t]he Company made no political donations during the year in line
with its policy.”182
Some of the same firms that have policies against political dona-
tions have sought shareholder authorizations to avoid inadvertent vio-
lations of British law. Cadbury, a British candy company, took this
precautionary approach:
The Company has a long standing policy of not making con-
tributions to any political party . . . . [N]either the Company, nor
any of its subsidiaries, made any donation to any registered
party . . . .
However, the [PPERA] contains very wide definitions of what
constitutes a political donation and political expenditure. Accord-
ingly, as a precautionary measure to protect the Company . . . ,
approval will be sought at the 2009 AGM for the Company to make
donations to political organisations . . . of £100,000.183
Again, despite seeking shareholder approval of budgets of
£100,000, or even greater, actual political spending by U.K. firms is
typically far lower than the amount that the shareholder authorized.
As the aggregate actual spending shows, between 2001–2010 share-
holders authorized managers at publicly traded companies to spend
£85.6 million, but managers actually spent £10.2 million, a far smaller
sum.
Throughout the entire decade of 2001–2010, out of the 226
unique companies seeking shareholder approvals, we have identified
only twenty companies that spent more than £5000, with an average of
£252,000 and a median expenditure of £29,500, for a total of approxi-
mately £5.04 million.184
182. BURBERRY GRP., ANNUAL REPORT 2010/11, at 69 (2011), available at http://
201011.annualreport.burberry.com/projet/multimedia/files/Full_annual_report.pdf.
183. CADBURY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2008, at 55 (2009), available at http://
cadburyar2008.production.investis.com/~/media/Files/C/cadbury-ar-2008/pdf/
cadbury_ra_13mb_compressed.ashx. On Feb. 2, 2010, Cadbury became part of Kraft Foods
and no longer reports as a separate company. Kraft Foods Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K) 4 (2010), http://www.kraftfoodscompany.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/pdf/
KraftFoods_10K_20110228.pdf.
184. The difference between the £5.04 million that was shareholder-authorized and
the £10.2 million that was spent by publicly traded companies is attributable to a few big
spenders who appear to have spent more than their shareholders have authorized. Two of
these companies, Intercapital and Flowidea, account for much of this difference. These
two companies are discussed below. See infra Part III.B.7. Some of the difference is also
caused by the spending by publicly traded companies below £5000, which does not require
shareholder authorization.
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Exhibit 5: Cash Donations Before and After the 2000 Rule185
Panel A : Donations from Listed Companies
No. of Number Standard
Unique of Avg Deviation
1993–2000 Donors* donations Total (£) (£) Min(£) Max(£) (£)
Conservative 104 272 5,275,103 19,394 100 105,000 21,989
Labour 7 11 191,000 17,364 500 70,000 24,833
Liberal Democrats 1 1 25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 -
Other 3 3 54,500 18,167 5,500 29,000 11,857
Subtotal 115 287 5,545,603 19,323 100 105,000 21,931
2001–2010
Conservative 45 103 9,412,605 91,385 1,114 1,077,218 179,294
Labour 33 61 674,406 11,056 550 160,000 20,372
Liberal Democrats 8 13 137,607 10,585 1,070 56,500 15,166
Other 2 4 7,504 1,876 600 2,493 878
Subtotal 88 181 10,232,122 56,531 550 1,077,218 141,367
1993–2010 195 468 15,777,725 33,713 100 1,077,218 91,250
Panel B : Donations from Unlisted Companies
No. of Number Standard
Unique of Avg Deviation
1993–2000 Donors* donations Total (£) (£) Min(£) Max(£) (£)
Conservative 111 267 5,044,012 18,891 100 274,000 40,233
Labour 12 16 412,038 25,752 500 109,000 36,422
Liberal Democrats - - - - - - -
Other 2 2 28,000 14,000 3,000 25,000 15,556
Subtotal 119 285 5,484,050 19,242 100 274,000 39,871
2001–2010
Conservative 559 982 21,620,000 22,016 250 1,031,000 57,246
Labour 148 229 3,044,354 13,294 486 400,000 31,764
Liberal Democrats 50 99 4,817,567 48,662 1,000 2,419,065 245,560
Other 34 60 2,257,576 37,626 300 540,640 98,336
Subtotal 790 1,368 31,744,495 23,205 250 2,419,065 85,636
1993–2010 883 1,655 37,228,545 22,495 100 2,419,065 79,602
* This number represents unique donors, who could gave to multiple parties.
7. Unauthorized Political Spending
One of the advantages of having a comprehensive data set with
both the shareholder votes authorizing corporate political spending
and the corporate political spending itself is that we can test the level
of compliance with the relevant sections of the Companies Act. As the
U.S. data has long revealed, existence of a campaign finance law or
regulation is no guarantee that political spenders will comply with the
185. In Exhibit 5, listed companies are those that were publicly traded at the time that
the donation was given. A few companies in our sample were delisted between 1993 and
2010, such as Kelda Group Plc and Peel Holdings Plc, but we treated them as public in the
years before they were delisted. We also count ICAP’s Intercapital and Arbuthnot Banking
Group PLC’s Flowidea as public, two complexly structured companies which will be
discussed in further detail below as potential overspenders. See infra Part III.B.7.
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law.186 And in the U.K. data, we identified evidence of what appeared
to be at least two scofflaws. For years, Flowidea Ltd. has been a major
funder of the Conservative Party.187 In 2007 alone, this company gave
the Conservatives £247,094.188 However, Flowidea is a subsidiary of Ar-
buthnot Banking Group PLC, a company listed on the London Stock
Exchange.189 But it does not appear that shareholders from Arbuth-
not Banking Group PLC have voted to authorize these expenditures
at these levels. For example, in its 2010 annual report, the company
reported “a political donation of £25,000 to the Conservative Party
during the year (2009: political donations £25,472).”190 Meanwhile,
data from the Electoral Commission showed Flowidea had spent
£131,170191 in 2009 and £210,300 in 2010192—far greater amounts
than those revealed to or authorized by shareholders of the parent
186. See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 112, at 158–59; GENOVESE, supra note 112, at 23;
Roule, supra note 112, at 584; Milk and Money, supra note 112; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975) (reviewing violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s ban on the use of
corporate treasury funds in federal elections).
187. Donations Advanced Search, supra note 156 (type “Flowidea” into the “Donor name”
field and click “Go”) (listing several donations to the Conservative and Unionist Party).
188. The total of £247,094 is derived by adding all donations from Flowidea to the
Conservative and Unionist Party in 2007. See id. (type “Flowidea” into the “Donor Name”
field; check “Deselect all” box in the “Period” field; check off “Quarter 1 (2007),” “Quarter
2 (2007),” “Quarter 3 (2007),” and “Quarter 4 (2007)” boxes in the “Period” field; and
click “Go”).
189. Robert Watts, The Companies Shovelling Cash at the Tories, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Nov. 28, 2004, (City), at 8.
190. ARBUTHNOT BANKING GRP., ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2010, at 19 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.arbuthnotgroup.com/uploads/ABG_2010_R&A_WEB.pdf. The CEO of
Arbuthnot is Henry Angest. Id. at 16. Mr. Angest owns a 52.8% share in the company. Id. at
18. This may explain why the company is spending more than its shareholders have author-
ized since his block of shares alone would ensure approval. However, there is no exception
in the Companies Act for skipping the formal shareholder approval process for political
spending, and his majority stock ownership does not explain the underreporting of Flo-
widea’s donations to investors in the annual report. See also ARBUTHNOT BANKING GRP.,
ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 19 (2009), available at http://www.arbuthnotgroup.com/
uploads/ABG2009CompleteFinal.pdf (“The Company made political donations of £25,472
to the Conservative Party and £3,000 to the Centre of Social Justice during the year
[2009].”); ARBUTHNOT BANKING GROUP PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 19 (2008), available
at http://www.arbuthnotgroup.com/uploads/09.03.31ABG_08_R&A_WEB.pdf (“The
Company made a donation of £10,000 to the Policy Exchange think tank, which is consid-
ered to be a political donation.”).
191. The total of £131,170 is derived by adding all donations from Flowidea to the
Conservative and Unionist Party in 2009. See Donations Advanced Search, supra note 156 (type
“Flowidea” into the “Donor Name” field; check “Deselect all” box in the “Period” field;
check off “Quarter 1 (2009),” “Quarter 2 (2009),” “Quarter 3 (2009),” and “Quarter 4
(2009)” boxes in the “Period” field; and click “Go”).
192. The total of £210,300 is derived by adding all donations from Flowidea to the
Conservative and Unionist Party in 2010. See id. (type “Flowidea” into the “Donor Name”
field; check “Deselect all” box in the “Period” field; check off “Quarter 1 (2010),” “Quarter
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company.193 This donor caught the attention and criticism of the Brit-
ish press, which in one story noted, “[t]his company has no website, its
telephone number is not registered with directory enquiries and when
The Sunday Telegraph rang the office listed by Companies House as
its registered address no-one had even heard of Flowidea.”194
Another large donor to the Conservative party called Intercapital
Private Group Ltd. (“IPGL”) also appeared to be spending far more
on politics than its shareholders have authorized. As reported to the
Electoral Commission, IPGL spent between £200,000 and £1,077,218
per year,195 but shareholders of ICAP, its publicly traded affiliated
company, only had shareholder authorization for £100,000 per
year.196 In total, between 2001 and 2009, shareholders at ICAP author-
ized £900,000 in spending, but over that same period the affiliated
companies spent £3,565,367—more than three times the authorized
amount.197 The overall review of our dataset shows that the U.K. law
2 (2010),” “Quarter 3 (2010),” and “Quarter 4 (2010)” in the “Period” field; and click
“Go”).
193. Arbuthnot Banking Grp., Letter from the Chairman of the Board of Directors to
Shareholders 3 (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.arbuthnotgroup.com/uploads/280311Chair-
man_Letter_ARTWORK.pdf (noting that 2007 was the last time shareholders authorized
political spending).
194. Watts, supra note 189; see also Jamie Doward, Publicity-Shy Conservative Donor Re-
vealed as Paymaster of Anti-European Activists, OBSERVER (U.K.), Apr. 11, 2010, at 4 (reporting
Henry Angest funneled almost £7 in political donations through Flowidea).
195. The £1,077,218 was given by IPGL in four separate donations to the Conservative
Party in 2006. Donation Advanced Search, supra note 156 (type “IPGL” into the “Donor
Name” field; type “Conservative and Unionist Party” in the “Entity Name” field; and click
“Go”).
196. The authorizations are listed in our PIRC data. For a sample authorization, see
ICAP plc, Annual General Meeting: Proxy Results (July 15, 2009), http://www.icap.com/
Download.aspx?fileid=f318c70d-069f-4762-9e85-0517d0133fa4 (reporting vote totals);
ICAP, Resolutions Passed (July 15, 2009), http://www.icap.com/Download.aspx?fileid=8e
92a58f-cc88-4db2-bd42-0013f806e880 (noting in resolution 12 that “the aggregate amount
of any such donations and expenditure shall not exceed £100,000 during the period begin-
ning with the date of the passing of this resolution and expiring at the conclusion of the
Company’s annual general meeting in 2010”).
197. The total of £3,565,367 is derived by adding all donations from ICAP and IPGL to
the Conservative Party between 2001 and 2009. Donations Advanced Search, supra note 156
(type “IPGL” into the “Donor Name” field and click “Go”; repeat this operation with “In-
tercapital”). The authors downloaded this data in September 2010. The ownership struc-
ture of the ICAP family of companies is opaque in their annual reports because so many
entities in the group have nearly identical names. On the one hand, a footnote in the
financial statements indicates that the CEO of ICAP and his spouse “own approximately
55.10% of IPGL Limited,” which in turn owns 21.32% of ICAP. ICAP, ANNUAL REPORT
2009, at 45 (2009), available at http://ar2009.icap.com/files/pdf/ICAP_report_2009.pdf.
On the other hand, the same report states, “[t]he Company’s immediate subsidiary compa-
nies are ICAP Group Holdings Limited, Intercapital Limited (formerly plc) and Garban
Group Holdings Limited, all of which are incorporated in England and are 100% owned
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encourages responsible spending with shareholder approval, but this
is not an ironclad barrier for those companies that attempt to game
the system, as these two examples demonstrate.
8. Resistance to U.K. Corporate Political Spending
One explanation for why U.K. firms exhibit self-restraint in politi-
cal spending is that investors, including institutional investors, de-
mand it. Investors have been vocal opponents to corporate political
spending in the United Kingdom. For example, in recent years, lead-
ing business institutions in the United Kingdom have discouraged cor-
porate political spending. The Association of British Insurers (“ABI”)
issued the “Companies Act and Articles of Association Guidance” in
October 2009.198 This document included guidance to companies
about political spending, including spending in the EU elections.199
The Association suggested:
The Company should affirm that it is their policy not to make polit-
ical donations and that they have no intention of using the author-
ity for that purpose. Authorities may be made under law for up to
four years; however [sic] best practice is that approval should be
sought on an annual basis.200
The National Association of Pension Funds (“NAPF”) shared
ABI’s approach and issued guidance to companies in 2010, discourag-
ing political spending.201 NAPF stated:
F.8.1. The NAPF opposes the payment of bona fide political dona-
tions. Under EU legislation, the term could potentially encompass
donations to charities or educational causes. It is therefore com-
mon for authorities to be sought on a precautionary basis.
F.8.2. Where authority is sought, it should be specified that:
• Bona fide political donations are precluded
• A cap is set on the level of donations[.]
F.8.3. It is acceptable to seek authority for a four-year period where
the company has no history of making bona fide political dona-
tions. However, where the authority sought exceeds one year, the
by the Company.” Id. at 121. If the donations are from the public company, then they are
far bigger than the shareholders authorized.
198. ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, COMPANIES ACT AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION GUI-
DANCE (2009), http://www.ivis.co.uk/PDF/3.5_Articles_of_Association.pdf.
199. Id. at 3.
200. Id.
201. NAT’L ASS’N OF PENSION FUNDS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY AND VOTING
GUIDELINES 41 (2010), available at http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/Document
Library/~/media/Policy/Documents/0154_Corporate_governance_policy_and_voting_
guidelines_2010.ashx.
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company should clarify that separate authorisation will be sought
at the following AGM should the authorisation be utilised.202
Finally, PIRC also advises shareholders against corporate political
spending and is a bit more restrictive than NAPF:
As a matter of principle, PIRC generally regards use of share-
owner funds of listed companies to support political organisations
as unacceptable.
. . . .
PIRC will support [precautionary] resolutions provided politi-
cal parties are specifically excluded, the authority is for no more
than one year and the amount is reasonable given the size of the
company and amounts previously disclosed as political
“expenditure”. . . .
If donations were made during the year a full breakdown of
recipients should be provided together with a clear justification for
how any donations are in shareowners’ interests. Political dona-
tions are only one aspect of companies’ involvement in the politi-
cal process. A company should disclose publicly its position where
it is lobbying on matters that affect the business.203
Thus, PIRC suggests, as ABI does, that listed companies should
restrict authorizations of political spending to an annual basis (instead
of the four years that are statutorily allowed). PIRC also suggests that
companies should list lobbying as well as political donations in their
reports to shareholders.
Our research also showed that some British pension funds cate-
gorically opposed corporate political spending and stated this in their
explanations of their voting philosophies. For example, the South
Yorkshire Pension Fund Corporate Governance Policy stated unequiv-
ocally: the pension’s policy is to “[v]ote against all resolutions to ap-
prove political donations as this is an inappropriate use of
shareholder funds.”204 London Borough of Bexley Pension Fund
adopted this same approach, noting “[i]t is inappropriate for a com-
pany to make such [political] donations.”205 And the London Bor-
ough of Sutton Pension Fund declared, “[w]e normally consider any
political donations to be a mis-use [sic] of shareholders’ funds and
202. Id.
203. PENSIONS INV. RESEARCH CONSULTANTS, UK SHAREHOLDER VOTING GUIDELINES
2011, at 41 (2011).
204. S. YORKSHIRE PENSIONS AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2005–2006, at
40 (2006), available at http://www.sypensions.org.uk/Publications/Reports/tabid/248/
language/en-GB/Default.aspx (follow “Next” hyperlink until you find “SYPA annual report
and accounts 2005–2006”; click on the “DOWNLOAD” hyperlink next to “SYPA annual
report and accounts 2005–2006”).
205. LONDON BOROUGH OF BEXLEY PENSION FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 2008/2009, at 37
(2009), available at http://democracy.bexley.gov.uk/mgConvert2PDF.aspx?ID=11906.
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will vote against resolutions proposing them.”206 This position was also
shared by J.P. Morgan Asset Management in the UK.207
Despite these policies opposing political spending, shareholders
generally approved corporate political budgets requested by British
firms.208 It is possible that these industry groups’ stances against cor-
porate political spending may actually encourage companies to exer-
cise self-restraint and spend zero pounds, or that this peer pressure
explains the modest size of most political budgets (£50,000 or
£100,000).
U.K. shareholders have, however, defeated a shareholder-pro-
posed political budget. In 2004, shareholders voted against a resolu-
tion to authorize £1.25 million in political spending by BAA plc.209
Angry after learning that BAA had given free airport parking passes to
members of Parliament, a shareholder proposed this resolution.210 The
shareholder considered these free passes to be political donations,
and he therefore sought shareholder approval of the value of the
passes.211 The shareholders voted against this authorization.212 This
result could be because shareholders disagreed with the motives or
conclusions of the shareholder who made the proposal. Nonetheless,
after the shareholder vote, BAA stopped giving free passes to
parliamentarians.213
The BAA example shows the importance of transparency and the
impact of empowered shareholders. When a corporation spends a
large sum on politics, shareholders can react to the disclosure by at-
tempting to limit such spending in the future.214
206. LONDON BOROUGH OF SUTTON PENSION FUND, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT PRINCI-
PLES 12 (2006), http://www.sutton.gov.uk/ChttpHandler.ashx?id=876&p=0 (emphasis
omitted).
207. J.P. MORGAN ASSET MGMT., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY & VOTING GUIDELINES
12 (2011), http://www.jpmorganassetmanagement.co.uk/Institutional/_documents/
CG%20Guidelines_February%202011.pdf (“JPMAM does not support the use of share-
holder funds for political donations.”).
208. See supra Exhibit 4.
209. BAA PLC: Result of AGM, supra note 89.
210. Ben Webster, Unhappy Landing for MPs’ Parking Perk, TIMES (London), July 28,
2004, https://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1193813,00.html.
211. Id.
212. Id.; BAA PLC: Result of AGM, supra note 89.
213. See BAA PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, at 47 (2005), available at http://www.baa.
com/assets/B2CPortal/Static%20Files/BAAAnnualReport2004-05.pdf (“BAA no longer
provides free airport car parking passes for parliamentarians. The concession . . . was not
renewed after the general election on 5 May 2005 following widespread consultation with
shareholders and the parliamentary authorities.”).
214. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 3.
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Conclusions
In the majority opinion in Citizens United, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy wrote that “with the advent of the internet, prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the informa-
tion needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for
their positions and supporters.”215 Justice Kennedy correctly stated
that knowledge of corporate political spending will help shareholders
and voters alike make informed decisions. The world he pictured in
Citizens United of transparent corporate expenditures does not exist in
the United States, but it should.216 Implementing a disclosure require-
ment similar to the U.K. Companies Act through the U.S. securities
laws or S.E.C. regulations is one way to achieve transparency for politi-
cal spending by publicly traded corporations.217
The United Kingdom provides a live example for the new post-
Citizens United system in the United States. Our data demonstrated
that the U.K. Companies Act has not banned corporate political
spending. Rather, shareholders of companies that sought approval of
political budgets nearly always approve them. On the other hand,
post-2000, forty-nine companies in the sample stopped spending on
politics. Moreover, managers sought and shareholders approved cor-
porate political budgets that were typically modest—ranging from
£50,000 to £100,000. Also notable was the fact that corporate political
spending for publicly traded companies in the United Kingdom from
2000–2010 was far below the overall shareholder-authorized amounts.
Our data revealed another trend. After the PPERA, political
spending appears to have migrated from publicly traded companies to
privately held companies in the past decade.
While the U.K. system was not perfect during the time frame that
we studied (2000–2010), and a few companies were apparently spend-
ing far above their approved budgets, it was still years ahead of the
U.S. inadequate laws, which leave both shareholders and voters in the
dark about the sources of corporate political spending. Overall, the
U.K. system provided shareholders with the ability to consent or ob-
ject to future political spending, and the companies subject to the
215. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct 876, 916 (2010).
216. See Corporate Governance After Citizens United, supra note 3.
217. See Bebchuk Letter, supra note 18; see also Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Petition
to Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political
Activities, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
637/4-637.shtml (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) (listing hyperlinks to comments on the peti-
tion by Lucian Bechuk requiring disclosure of corporate political spending).
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Companies Act reported their spending directly to their shareholders
in annual reports. Meanwhile, the requirement that political parties
had to report the source of their funding to the voting public through
the Electoral Commission’s webpage bolstered this transparency.
The successes of the United Kingdom in administering the Com-
panies Act’s transparency and accountability requirements for corpo-
rate political spending show that such a system is a workable
alternative for the United States to adopt. In summation, we argue
that the evidence shows that the U.K. approach is far better than that
of the United States’, where presently corporate political spending by
publicly traded companies can be hidden from voters and investors—
and even the spending that is out in open is not approved by compa-
nies’ true owners. We find an argument that was made in London in
the late 1990s persuasive: if a corporate manager finds a political
cause compelling, then she should not use other people’s money to
support it. Rather, she should reach into her own pocket and spend
her own money. Unfortunately, U.S. law does little to protect share-
holders from corporate managers’ using corporate funds on politics.
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Appendix A: Selected Historical Portions of British Corporate
Law
Reporting requirements to shareholders of British companies’ politi-
cal spending:
3.—(1) If—
(a) the company . . . has in the financial year—
(i) made any donation to any registered party or to any
other EU political organisation, or
(ii) incurred any EU political expenditure, and
(b) the amount of the donation or expenditure, or (as the
case may be) the aggregate amount of all donations and ex-
penditure falling within paragraph (a), exceeded £200,
the directors’ report for the year shall contain the particulars speci-
fied in sub-paragraph (2).
(2) Those particulars are—
(a) as respects donations falling within sub-paragraph
(1)(a)(i)—
(i) the name of each registered party or other organisa-
tion to whom any such donation has been made, and
(ii) the total amount given to that party or organisation
by way of such donations in the financial year; and
(b) as respects expenditure falling within sub-paragraph
(1)(a)(ii), the total amount incurred by way of such expendi-
ture in the financial year. . . .
4.—
. . . .
(3) In this paragraph “contribution”, in relation to an organisa-
tion, means—
(a) any gift of money to the organisation (whether made di-
rectly or indirectly);
(b) any subscription or other fee paid for affiliation to, or
membership of, the organisation; or
(c) any money spent (otherwise than by the organisation or a
person acting on its behalf) in paying any expenses incurred
directly or indirectly by the organisation.218
British Companies must get consent from shareholders to make politi-
cal expenditures:
(1) A company must not—
(a) make a political donation to a political party or other
politicalorganisation, or to an independent election candi-
date, or
(b) incur any political expenditure,
unless the donation or expenditure is authorised in accordance
with the following provisions.
(2) The donation or expenditure must be authorised—
218. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 140 (U.K.), repealed
by Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1295, sched. 16 (U.K.).
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(a) in the case of a company that is not a subsidiary of another
company, by a resolution of the members of the company;
(b) in the case of a company that is a subsidiary of another
company by—
(i) a resolution of the members of the company, and
(ii) a resolution of the members of any relevant holding
company.
. . . .
(5) The resolution or resolutions required by this section—
(a) must comply with section 367 (form of authorising resolu-
tion), and
(b) must be passed before the donation is made or the expen-
diture incurred.219
Directors who do not get authorization from shareholders are liable:
(1) This section applies where a company has made a political do-
nation or incurred political expenditure without the authorisation
required by this Part.
(2) The directors in default are jointly and severally liable—
(a) to make good to the company the amount of the
unauthorised donation or expenditure, with interest, and
(b) to compensate the company for any loss or damage sus-
tained by it as a result of the unauthorised donation or expen-
diture having been made.
(3) The directors in default are—
(a) those who, at the time the unauthorised donation was
made or the unauthorised expenditure was incurred, were di-
rectors of the company by which the donation was made or the
expenditure was incurred, and
(b) where—
(i) that company was a subsidiary of a relevant holding
company, and
(ii) the directors of the relevant holding company failed
to take all reasonable steps to prevent the donation being
made or the expenditure being incurred.F220
219. Companies Act § 366.
220. Id. § 369.
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